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MIRAGE IN THE GULF?: EXAMINING THE UPSURGE IN FDI
IN THE GCC AND ITS LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MENA REGION
Jordan E. Toone∗
Between 2002 and 2010, foreign direct investment (“FDI”) exploded in the
Gulf Cooperation Council (“GCC”). Between 2002 and 2008 alone, FDI in
the GCC increased over 3800%, outpacing both the developed and developing
world by a significant margin. Although recent data suggests that FDI has
declined in the GCC since 2010, scholars have yet to proffer nuanced analyses
of the upsurge in FDI between 2002 and 2010. In general, the literature has
not adequately examined the relatively dramatic increase in FDI in the GCC
insofar as it has focused on pre-2002 data, failed to distinguish between FDI
trends in the GCC and those in the wider Middle East and North Africa
(“MENA”) region, ascribed the increased levels of FDI in the GCC solely to
the rise in the price of crude oil, or examined post-2002 increases and
decreases in FDI within unrepresentative contexts. More importantly, scholars
have yet to examine whether the increase in FDI has facilitated economic
growth in the GCC since 2002.
Relying on information from the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, the World Bank, and, where available, GCC countries
themselves, this Article introduces statistical evidence into the scholarly debate
on FDI in the GCC and the broader MENA region, revealing the dramatic
upsurge in FDI in the GCC between 2002 and 2010 in comparison to global
and regional trends. This Article also examines the general legal frameworks
governing FDI regimes in the GCC, demonstrating the unique manner in
which GCC states have implemented liberal macroeconomic policies while
simultaneously maintaining regulatory control over strategic elements of their
FDI regimes. Finally, this Article contributes to the ongoing scholarly debate
surrounding the relationship between FDI and economic growth by examining
the impact that the increased levels of FDI have had on economic growth in
∗ Associate at White & Case LLP. I would like to thank Antony Anghie for his insightful comments. I
am also indebted to the faculty and staff affiliated with the Visiting Researcher Program at Yale Law School
for kindly providing the much needed time and resources necessary to revise this Article. In addition, I am
especially grateful to Lindsay Toone, whose counsel and encouragement facilitated the research, writing, and
editing of this Article. I alone am responsible for all errors herein.
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GCC economies. Based on the available data, the statistical correlation
between the dramatic increases in FDI and short-term economic growth in the
GCC is minimal. The data suggests a stronger link between FDI and long-term
economic growth in the GCC, although a definitive assessment requires a
more nuanced statistical analysis. Thus, even if FDI levels had not declined
after 2010, the data suggests that GCC states—and, by implication, other
MENA states—ought to exercise restraint in assuming that increased levels of
FDI translate into increased economic growth, at least in the short term. The
findings herein are timely for other resource-rich, non-GCC states in the
MENA region, particularly post-Arab spring democracies, as they reconsider
traditional approaches to FDI in their efforts to foster economic development
without surrendering regulatory control over strategic elements of state
sovereignty.
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INTRODUCTION
Between 2002 and 2010, the Gulf Cooperation Council (“GCC”)1
experienced a 2533% overall increase in inward foreign direct investment
(“FDI”) flows, significantly outpacing global increases (108%) during the
same period.2 Foreign stock investment3 flows into the GCC increased at high
rates during this same period.4 Although recent data shows that FDI in the
GCC has declined from its peak in 2008,5 there is not a substantial volume of
scholarly research concerning the reasons behind either the increase in FDI in
the GCC or its subsequent decline.6 The impact that these fluctuations—
particularly the increases—in FDI have had on economic development in the
GCC since 2002 is an important question that this Article will examine.
Relying on information from the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (“UNCTAD”), the World Bank, and, where available, the GCC
countries themselves, this Article adumbrates statistical evidence
demonstrating the upsurge of FDI in the GCC, which, since 2002, has
witnessed a yearly percentage increase in FDI that rivals any economic union,
region, or individual state anywhere in the world. Even though FDI levels in
the GCC began to decline in 2009, the dramatic increase in FDI in the GCC
prior to 2009 provides scholars an excellent case study with which to examine
the impact that FDI has on economic growth, thereby contributing to the

1 Also known as the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf. See Cooperation Council for
the Arab States Charter, May 25, 1981, 26 I.L.M. 1131 [hereinafter GCC Charter], available at http://www.
gcc-sg.org/eng/indexfc7a.html. For a discussion of the GCC and its members, see infra Part II.
2 See U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD], Inward and Outward Foreign Direct Investment
Flows, Annual, 1970–2011, UNCTADSTAT (July 18, 2012), http://unctadstat.unctad.org/TableViewer/
tableView.aspx?ReportId=88 [hereinafter UNCTAD, FDI Statistics].
3 For definitions of “foreign investment” and “foreign stock investment,” see, respectively, infra notes
36 and 73 and accompanying text.
4 See UNCTAD, Inward and Outward Foreign Direct Investment Stock, Annual, 1980–2011,
UNCTADSTAT (July 18, 2012), http://unctadstat.unctad.org/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=89
[hereinafter UNCTAD, Foreign Stock Statistics].
5 UNCTAD, FDI Statistics, supra note 2 (showing that in 2009, 2010, and 2011, FDI in the GCC has
declined from its peak in 2008); UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2012, at 48–50, U.N. Sales No.
E.12.II.D.3 (2012), [hereinafter WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2012] available at http://www.unctad-docs.org/
files/UNCTAD-WIR2012-Full-en.pdf.
6 For an example of scholarship relating to FDI in the GCC, see Wasseem Mina, Do Bilateral
Investment Treaties Encourage FDI in the GCC Countries?, 2 AFR. REV. ECON. & FIN. 1 (2010), available at
http://african-review.com/Vol.%202%20(1)/Bilateral%20Investment%20Treaties%20and%20FDI.pdf. In 2012
UNCTAD suggested the decline in FDI could be attributed in part to the fact that GCC countries were still
recovering from the cancellation of large-scale projects in the wake of the global financial crisis. WORLD
INVESTMENT REPORT 2012, supra note 5, at 49.
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ongoing scholarly debate over the relationship between FDI and both shortterm and long-term economic growth.7
Following a brief overview in Part I of the literature surrounding FDI in the
GCC and broader Middle East and North Africa (“MENA”) region, Part II
provides statistical evidence from UNCTAD, the World Bank, and the GCC
countries themselves outlining the upsurge of FDI in the GCC since 2002,
followed by a brief overview of FDI levels since 2010. Part III briefly outlines
and examines the legal framework governing the FDI regimes in the GCC
states, revealing the unique manner in which the GCC states have promoted
liberal economic policies while concomitantly maintaining regulatory control
over important elements of their FDI regimes. Part IV then provides a modest
contribution to the ongoing debate surrounding the relationship between FDI
and economic growth by outlining the statistical impact that the increased
levels of FDI have had on short-term economic growth in the GCC since 2002.
I. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Although scholars, the media, international institutions, and governments
or governmental organizations have examined various aspects of FDI in the
Gulf, no academic study to date has been conducted which examines the
increase of FDI in the GCC since 2002 or comprehensively analyzes the legal
framework governing FDI in the GCC. The following is a brief overview of
the existing literature on the topic.
To begin with, much of the academic literature on the topic of FDI in the
GCC is outdated. The dramatic rise in FDI has only occurred since 2002,
making literature even from the late 1990s and early to mid-2000s outdated.8
For example, the World Bank’s publication, Trade, Investment, and
Development in the Middle East and North Africa, examines several key
elements of the legal regimes governing FDI in the GCC, but because it was

7

For more on the debate, see infra Part IV.A.
See, e.g., E. Mick Riordan et al., The World Economy and Its Implications for the Middle East and
North Africa, 1995–2010, in PROSPECTS FOR MENA ECONOMIES: FROM BOOM TO BUST AND BACK? 15, 16,
20–21 (Nemat Shafik ed., 1998) (stating that there was “little growth in real oil prices expected through
2010”); Mona S.W. Bseiso, Inter-Arab Inv. Guarantee Corp., The Role of Government in Promoting FDI in
the Gulf Region, (Jan. 24, 2003) (unpublished conference paper, Eighth Annual WAIPA Conference),
available at http://www.fdi.net/documents/WorldBank/databases/waipa/gulfregion.htm; M. Kabir Hassan,
FDI, Information Technology and Economic Growth in the MENA Region (Econ. Research Forum,
Conference Paper No. 102003002, 2003), available at http://www.erf.org.eg/CMS/uploads/pdf/1184753796_
Kabir_Hassan.pdf.
8
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written in 2003, it could not address the dramatic increase in FDI that has taken
place since 2002.9 Even later studies conducted in 2007 could not fully
examine the trends emerging in FDI flows into the GCC10 because 2007 and
2008 saw particularly notable increases in FDI flows into the GCC.11 Not
surprisingly, studies conducted before the upsurge in FDI into the GCC adopt a
very pessimistic view of FDI potential in the GCC and broader MENA
region.12
While reports written for more business-oriented audiences—such as those
written by International Business Publications—examine more recent trends,
they take a rather narrow, business-centric approach and fail to examine
broader trends regarding FDI within the GCC in comparison to the global

9 THE WORLD BANK, REPORT NO. 26761, TRADE, INVESTMENT, AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE
EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 2 (2003) [hereinafter WORLD BANK MENA DEVELOPMENT REPORT], available at
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/10/03/000094946_030925041526
61/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf (“The 1990s were marked by stagnant or declining trade and private
investment—MENA was the only region in the world to experience a reversal. . . . [T]rade and investment
reforms have been hesitant and cautious, and outcomes weaker still.”).
10 E.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], MAKING REFORMS SUCCEED: MOVING
FORWARD WITH THE MENA INVESTMENT POLICY AGENDA (2008) [hereinafter MENA INVESTMENT POLICY
AGENDA]; Muawya Ahmed Hussein, Impacts of Foreign Direct Investment on Economic Growth in the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries, 5 INT’L REV. BUS. RES. PAPERS 362, 365 (2009) (looking at the FDI
effect on economic growth in the GCC between 1999 and 2007); Farrukh Iqbal & Mustapha Kamel Nabli,
Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, and Development in the Middle East and North Africa, in MUSTAPHA
KAMEL NABLI, WORLD BANK, BREAKING THE BARRIERS TO HIGHER ECONOMIC GROWTH 305 (2007) (“Even a
casual observer of international development trends cannot fail to notice that, in the last two decades or so, the
MENA region has lagged most other regions of the world in both development outcomes (such as growth and
employment) and international integration (such as trade and foreign investment).” (footnote omitted));
Wasseem Mina, The Location Determinants of FDI in the GCC Countries, 17 J. MULTINATIONAL FIN. MGMT.
336 (2007); Mustapha Sadni Jallab et al., Foreign Direct Investment, Macroeconomic Instability and Economic
Growth in MENA Countries 4 (Inst. of Econ. Theory & Analysis, Working Paper No. 08-17, 2008), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1170764 (noting that “[f]rom 2001 to 2003, the
UNCTAD inward FDI performance index shows that the MENA is far behind any other developing region
except South-Asia” (citation omitted)); Wasseem Mina, Are the GCC FDI Location Determinants Favorable?,
(Econ. Discussion Papers, No. 2007-23, 2007), available at http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/
discussionpapers/2007-23/count; Press Release, Dubai Chamber of Commerce & Indus., Foreign Direct
Investment and GCC Countries (Aug. 5, 2007), available at http://www.zawya.com/story/ZAWYA200708050
85717.
11 UNCTAD, FDI Statistics, supra note 2.
12 WORLD BANK MENA DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 9, at 1 (“[C]ompared with the rest of the
world, trade and investment climate reforms in the region have been decidedly weak.”); Mina, The Location
Determinants of FDI in the GCC Countries, supra note 10, at 337, 345. FDI was comparatively weak in the
GCC during the 1980s and 1990s, even with the rise in crude oil prices during the oil crisis of the 1980s. See
UNCTAD, FDI Statistics, supra note 2.
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marketplace.13 The press and financial institutions are better equipped than
academics to respond in a timely fashion to FDI fluctuations,14 yet they tend to
do so devoid of broader academic themes and contexts.
Partly because it is so outdated, much of the literature has been advisory in
nature. That is, given the low levels of FDI prior to the upsurge in FDI that
began in 2002, the literature has tended to prescribe solutions for GCC and
MENA states as to how to attract more FDI.15 Where the increase in FDI in the
GCC has been acknowledged, some scholars have attributed the upsurge to the
increase in oil prices.16
There have been some country-specific examinations dealing with FDI the
MENA region,17 the GCC itself,18 and with MENA investment ties to other

13 See, e.g., 1 INTERNATIONAL MIDDLE EAST AND ARABIC COUNTRIES FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND
PRIVATIZATION LAW HANDBOOK (Igor S. Oleynik & Natasha Alexander eds., 2006); see also, e.g., WORLD
BANK & INT’L FIN. CORP., DOING BUSINESS IN THE ARAB WORLD 2012, at 13–14 (2012), available at
http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/FPDKM/Doing%20Business/Documents/Special-Reports/DB12-Arab
World.pdf (reporting on business regulations in Arab countries, but specifically not focusing on regulations
related to foreign investment).
14 See, e.g., GCC FDI Flows Decline for Second Consecutive Year in 2010, IBQ (Oct. 16, 2011), http://
ibq.com.qa/mediacenter/publications/$Document/Default/en-gb/Copy/$UserFiles/ibqgccbrief161011eng.pdf;
Foreign Direct Investment Inflows into the GCC Region Declined by 15% to USD 50.8 Billion in 2009, AL
BAWABA (Sept. 6, 2010), http://www.albawaba.com/news/foreign-direct-investment-inflows-gcc-regiondeclined-15-usd-508-billion-2009.
15 WORLD BANK MENA DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 9, at 1–2 (“With more trade and investment,
countries in the region will be able to achieve faster growth, reduce poverty, create more jobs, and improve the
knowledge, skills, and productivity of their work force. . . . The region now needs to deepen and accelerate its
reform, finishing the process that it has started. It needs to make three fundamental shifts in its sources of
growth: from oil to nonoil sectors; from public, state-dominated to private, market-oriented activities; and
from protected, import-substitution to competitive, export-oriented activities. Intensifying trade and investment
is at the core of all three shifts.”); E. Mick Riordan et al., supra note 8, at 15–16.
16 E.g., Ibrahim Saif, The Oil Boom in the GCC Countries, 2002–2008, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR
INT’L PEACE 11 (2009), http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cmec15_saif_final.pdf (“The increase in oil
prices had a dramatic impact on the external economic position of the GCC countries. . . . [C]ountries of the
GCC became more attractive to foreign investors, thus attracting high levels of foreign direct investment
(FDI).”)
17 E.g., ASHRAF MISHRIF, INVESTING IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EUROPEAN
DIRECT INVESTMENT IN EGYPT (2010); Ahmed Kamaly, Evaluation of FDI Flows into the MENA Region,
(Econ. Research Forum, Conference Paper No. 092002009, 2002), available at http://www.erf.org.eg/
CMS/uploads/pdf/1185351142_FM-P_Ahmed_Kamaly.pdf; Peter A. Petri, The Case of Missing Foreign
Investment in the Southern Mediterranean (OECD Dev. Ctr., Working Paper No. 128, 1997); Imad A. Moosa,
The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in MENA Countries: An Extreme Bounds Analysis, ECON.
RESEARCH FORUM (Jan. 2004), http://www.erf.org.eg/CMS/uploads/pdf/1183874104_RR0421.pdf (policy
research report).
18 E.g., LOBNA ALI AL-KHALIFA, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN BAHRAIN (2010) (published thesis
discussing the role of FDI in Bahrain’s economic development).
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countries.19 These studies, however, do not conduct comparative analyses of
the rate of FDI growth in the GCC in relation to broader, global trends. Nor do
these studies attempt to examine the legal frameworks governing FDI in each
state. Some scholarship on FDI in the Middle East has failed to distinguish the
GCC from the broader MENA region,20 blurring what is otherwise a rather
distinct line between FDI levels and development in the GCC on the one hand,
and, on the other, the wider Arab world.
Overall, the literature is generally outdated and fails to make nuanced
assessments of the broader trends of FDI in the GCC and the legal regimes
giving effect to the upsurge in FDI. The literature tends to be advisory in
nature, although scholars increasingly recognize the impact that legal and
macroeconomic policy reforms have had on overall FDI levels. Moreover,
scholars have largely ignored the increase in foreign stock investments in the
GCC, and have yet to adopt the lessons of the resource-rich states of the Gulf
to other MENA economies. More importantly, scholars have yet to examine
the broader FDI trends in the GCC in light of the ongoing revolutions in the
MENA region.
II. STATISTICS
The GCC is a regional economic bloc consisting of six Middle Eastern
monarchies: Saudi Arabia—which accounted for forty percent of the GCC’s
gross domestic product (“GDP”) in 2010 and sixty percent of the total GCC
population21—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates
(“UAE”).22 Membership offers have been extended to Jordan and Morocco.23
The GCC was officially created on May 25, 1981, by the leaders of the six
19

See WORLD BANK MENA DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 9.
See, e.g., Steve Onyeiwu, Analysis of FDI Flows to Developing Countries: Is the MENA Region
Different? (Econ. Research Forum, Conference Paper No. 102003005, 2003), available at http://www.erf.org.
eg/CMS/uploads/pdf/1184754629_Steve_Onyeiwu.pdf; Simon Neaime & Marcus Marktanner, The Role of
Foreign Direct Investment for Economic Development in the MENA Region, TOPICS MIDDLE E. & N. AFR.
ECONOMIES (Sept. 2009), http://www.luc.edu/orgs/meea/volume11/PDFS/Paper-by-Neaime&Marktanner.pdf
(article published in volume 11 of the online journal Topics in Middle Eastern and North African Economies).
21 GULF INV. CORP., GCC ECONOMIC STATISTICS 8, 9 (10th ed. 2011), available at http://www.gic.com.
kw/site_media/uploads/gic_ar_crtd_4.20.12.pdf.
22 GCC Charter, supra note 1; OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, THE WORLD BANK, REPORT NO. 57517,
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE GCC 1–2, 4, 6 (2010) [hereinafter ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE GCC],
available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2010/10/27/00035
6161_20101027034540/Rendered/PDF/575170WP0Box353768B01PUBLIC10GCCStudyweb.pdf.
23 Amid Turmoil, GCC Extends Invitation to Jordan and Morocco, MIDDLE E. POL’Y COUNCIL (May 16,
2011), http://www.mepc.org/amid-turmoil-gcc-extends-invitation-jordan-and-morocco.
20
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aforementioned Arab states, with the goal of “effect[ing] coordination,
integration and inter-connection between member states in all fields in order to
achieve unity between them.”24 Headquartered in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, the
GCC is composed of the Supreme Council, a Commission for Settlement of
Disputes, a Ministerial Council, and a Secretariat General, with a SecretaryGeneral appointed by the Supreme Council.25 The GCC does not possess
“supranational competencies” and the Secretariat General is comparatively
weak.26 There has been mistrust between members, fostered primarily by the
comparative strength of Saudi Arabia and the UAE in relation to the other four
states.27 Although several similarities characterize the resource-rich, laborimporting states of the GCC, “the attitudes towards attracting
FDI . . . significantly differ from one GCC country to another.”28
Together, the six GCC member states account for roughly thirty percent of
the world’s proven oil reserves.29 From the 1970s to the 1990s, GCC member
states in general relied heavily on public funds generated through oil revenues,
marginalizing both private and foreign investments.30 In the early 2000s, many
GCC states began instituting broad reforms designed to encourage more
domestic and foreign private investment and to diversify the economies.31 In
addition to several state-led reforms, the GCC organization itself initiated
several trade- and investment-related initiatives, including the establishment of
a customs union in 2003.32

24

GCC Charter, supra note 1, art. 4.
Id. arts. 2, 6, 8.
26 Steffen Hertog, EU–GCC Relations in the Era of the Second Oil Boom 4 (Dec. 2007) (C·A·P Working
Paper), available at http://www.cap.lmu.de/download/2007/2007_hertog.pdf.
27 Robert Haddick, Foreign Policy: The Persian Gulf Needs Its Own NATO, NPR (May 21, 2012), http://
www.npr.org/2012/05/21/153196702/foreign-policy-the-persian-gulf-needs-its-own-nato.
28 Reyadh Y. Faras & Khalifa H. Ghali, Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth: The Case of
the GCC Countries, 29 INT’L RES. J. FIN. & ECON. 134, 135 (2009).
29 See The World Factbook: Oil-Proved Reserves, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/rankorder/2178rank.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2012); BP Statistical Review of World Energy
June 2012, BP 6 (June 2012), http://www.bp.com/assets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_
and_publications/statistical_energy_review_2011/STAGING/local_assets/pdf/statistical_review_of_world_ene
rgy_full_report_2012.pdf.
30 See Faras & Ghali, supra note 28, at 136.
31 Faruk Balli et al., The Patterns of Cross-Border Portfolio Investments in the GCC Region: Do
Institutional Quality and the Number of Expatriates Play a Role? 3, 17 (Univ. Library of Munich, Ger., MPRA
Paper No. 19966, 2009), available at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19966/2/MPRA_paper_19966.pdf.
32 ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE GCC, supra note 22, at 6.
25
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Beginning in 2002, the GCC began to see noticeable increases in FDI
inflows.33 Sufficient data on FDI inflows and outflows—taken mainly from
UNCTAD and the World Bank34—exists to enable scholars to make nuanced
estimations of FDI trends in the GCC during the past decade.
Part II.A summarizes FDI inflows into GCC countries between 2002 and
2010, followed by an outline of percentage increases of foreign stock
investments in the GCC during the same period in Part II.B. Part II.C provides
a brief overview of FDI trends in the GCC since 2010.
A. FDI Inflows in GCC Member States, 2002–2010
UNCTAD defines FDI as follows:
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is defined as an investment involving
a long-term relationship and reflecting a lasting interest and control
by a resident entity in one economy (foreign direct investor or parent
enterprise) in an enterprise resident in an economy other than that of
the foreign direct investor (FDI enterprise or affiliate enterprise or
foreign affiliate). . . . Such investment involves both the initial
transaction between the two entities and all subsequent transactions
between them and among foreign affiliates, both incorporated and
35
unincorporated.

Between 2002 and 2010, the GCC witnessed a 2533% increase in FDI, as
indicated in Table 1.36 This increase is over twenty times the increase in global
FDI levels, roughly ten times the increase in FDI levels in developing
economies, and roughly five times the increase in FDI levels witnessed in
transition economies worldwide.

33

UNCTAD, FDI Statistics, supra note 2.
Id.; Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.
KLT.DINV.CD.WD (last visited Oct. 24, 2012).
35 UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2009, Annex at 243, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2009, U.N.
Sales No. E.09.II.D.15 (2009) [hereinafter WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2009] (footnote omitted), available at
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/wir2009_en.pdf. In addition, UNCTAD states that: “Flows of FDI comprise capital
provided (either directly or through other related enterprises) by a foreign direct investor to an FDI enterprise,
or capital received from an FDI enterprise by a foreign direct investor. FDI has three components: equity
capital, reinvested earnings and intra-company loans.” Id.
36 See infra Table 1.
34
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Table 1. Inward FDI Flows—Developing, Transition, and Developed
Economies37
2002*

2010*

Percentage
Increase
2533.14%
108.45%
255.87%
555.02%
39.50%

$1515
$39,892
GCC
$627,975
$1,309,001
World
$173,283
$616,661
Developing Economies
$11,260
$73,755
Transition Economies
$443,432
$618,586
Developed Economies
*Measure: In millions of U.S. dollars at July 12, 2012, prices and exchange rates.

Table 1 reveals that among developing economies, the average increase in
FDI levels was roughly 256%. Developing economies experienced higher
year-to-year percentage increases in FDI than developed economies,38 and
therefore represent a more representative sample for comparative purposes.
Table 2 provides a comparison between the GCC and developing economies in
each major economic region of the world. As Table 2 indicates, even among
developing economies, the GCC percentage increase from 2002 to 2010 was
markedly higher.39
Table 2. Inward FDI Flows—Developing Economies Breakdown by Region40
2002*

2010*

Percentage Increase

GCC
Developing Economies:
Africa
Developing Economies:
America
Developing Economies: Asia
Developing Economies:
Oceania
Developing Economies
excluding Least Developed
Countries (“LDCs”)
Developing Economies
excluding China

$1515

$39,892

2533.14%

$14,630

$43,122

194.75%

$58,447

$187,401

220.63%

$100,083

$384,063

283.74%

$123

$2075

1586.99%

$166,441

$599,762

260.35%

$120,540

$501,927

316.40%

LDCs

$6842

$16,899

146.99%

*Measure: In millions of U.S. dollars at July 12, 2012, prices and exchange rates.

37
38
39
40

UNCTAD, FDI Statistics, supra note 2.
Id.
See Id.
Id.
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The GCC rate of increase for FDI inflows was higher than the increase
among high-, middle-, and low-income developing economies, as evidenced in
Table 3.
Table 3. Inward FDI Flows—High-, Middle-, and Low-Income Developing
Economies41
2002*

2010*

Percentage Increase

$1515
$39,892
2533.14%
GCC
High-income developing
$63,190
$317,198
401.97%
economies
Middle-income developing
$92,237
$222,545
141.28%
economies
Low-income developing
$17,857
$76,918
330.74%
economies
*Measure: In millions of U.S. dollars at July 12, 2012, prices and exchange rates.

Emerging economies and the “Newly Industrialized Asian Countries”
(“NIACs”) have also been associated with growth and high levels of FDI.42 As
evidenced in Table 4, the GCC had a noticeably higher percentage increase
between 2002 and 2010 than did the average emerging economy and the
NIACs.
Table 4. Inward FDI Flows—Emerging Economies and Newly Industrialized
Asian Countries43
2002*
2010*
Percentage Increase
$1515
$39,892
2533.14%
GCC
$64,887
$178,574
175.21%
Emerging economies
Newly Industrialized Asian
$29,017
$164,615
467.31%
Countries
*Measure: In millions of U.S. dollars at July 12, 2012, prices and exchange rates.

Table 5 provides comparative statistics for prominent geographic regions of
the world. As indicated in Table 5, Western Asia—the regional grouping of
states that, with the exception of the GCC, saw the highest percentage increase

41

Id.
See YUJIRO HAYAMI & YOSHIHISA GODO, DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS: FROM THE POVERTY TO THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 2 (3d ed. 2005) (referring to the growth of Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore).
See generally ANIS CHOWDHURY & IYANATUL ISLAM, THE NEWLY INDUSTRIALISING ECONOMIES OF EAST
ASIA (1993) (discussing the factors contributing to the high-levels of growth in East Asian newly
industrializing economies).
43 UNCTAD, FDI Statistics, supra note 2.
42
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of FDI flows during the period from 2002 to 201044—experienced only half
the percentage increase of FDI flows that the GCC witnessed during the same
period.
Table 5. Inward FDI Flows—Regions of the World45
GCC
Northern Africa
South America
Eastern Asia
Southern Asia

2002*
$1515
$3872
$27,990
$67,707

2010*
$39,892
$15,709
$90,357
$201,364

Percentage Increase
2533.14%
305.71%
222.82%
197.40%

$10,713
$4396
$17,268

$31,746
$58,193
$92,760

196.33%
1223.77%
437.18%

Western Asia
South-Eastern Asia
Northern Africa (excluding
$3159
$13,645
331.94%
Sudan)
South America (excluding
$11,400
$41,851
267.11%
Brazil)
Eastern and Southeastern Asia
$32,232
$179,390
456.56%
excluding China
$7586
49.24%
Southern Asia excluding India $5083
*Measure: In millions of U.S. dollars at July 12, 2012, prices and exchange rates.

Among prominent regional-economic unions, the GCC had a noticeably
higher percentage increase in FDI inflows between 2002 and 2010, as
indicated in Table 6.

44
45

Id.
Id.
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Table 6. Inward FDI Flows—Regional Economic/Political Unions46
2002*
$1515
$2580

2010*
$39,892
$7390

Percentage Increase
2533.14%
186.43%

GCC
Arab Maghreb Union (UMA)
ECOWAS (Economic
Community of West African
$2846
$11,695
310.93%
States)
$7257
$65,137
797.57%
League of Arab States
Organization of the Islamic
$27,012
$135,249
400.70%
Conference (OIC)
Union of South American
$27,990
$90,357
222.82%
Nations (UNASUR)
$120,539
$242,027
100.79%
NAFTA
$153,381
$343,379
123.87%
OAS
$17,268
$92,733
437.02%
ASEAN
$312,003
$318,227
1.99%
EU
APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic
$238,866
$632,085
164.62%
Cooperation)
*Measure: In millions of U.S. dollars at July 12, 2012, prices and exchange rates.

Similarly, the GCC’s percentage increase in FDI between 2002 and 2010
dramatically outpaced the percentage increases of the G8, the G20, and the
G77, as revealed in Table 7.
Table 7. Inward FDI Flows—G8, G20, G7747
2002*

2010*

Percentage Increase

GCC

$1515

$39,892

2533.14%

G8

$253,000

$400,635

58.35%

G20

$375,778

$712,008

89.48%

$143,668
$515,366
258.72%
G77
*Measure: In millions of U.S. dollars at July 12, 2012, prices and exchange rates.

As stated above, some scholars have attributed the upsurge in FDI in the
GCC since 2002 to the rise in oil prices.48 Table 8 reveals that the major
petroleum and gas exporting states all indeed experienced higher FDI
percentage increases from 2002 to 2010.49 However, the GCC’s percentage
46

Id.
Id.
48 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
49 This trend was especially pronounced from 2002 to 2008 in the GCC, during the so-called second oil
boom. See Saif, supra note 16, at 2.
47
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increase in FDI levels was notably higher than that of developed petroleum
economies, three times that of transition petroleum economies, and six times
that of developing petroleum economies.50
Table 8. Inward FDI Flows—Major Petroleum and Gas Exporting Countries51
2002*

2010*

Percentage Increase

$1515
$39,892
2533.14%
GCC
Major petroleum and gas
$17,500
$124,608
612.05%
exporters
Major petroleum and gas
exporters: Developing
$10,658
$53,033
397.59%
economies
Major petroleum and gas
exporters: Transition
$6051
$54,056
793.34%
economies
Major petroleum and gas
exporters: Developed
$791
$17,519
2114.79%
economies
*Measure: In millions of U.S. dollars at July 12, 2012, prices and exchange rates.

The data suggests that although the rise in the price of oil contributed to the
increased levels of FDI among petroleum and gas exporters from 2002 to 2010,
oil price was not the sole impetus to such increases within the GCC (or, as
shown below, at least within certain GCC member states). Such a conclusion is
substantiated by the variation among GCC member states with respect to the
percentage increases of FDI levels between 2002 and 2010. As indicated by
Table 9, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE each experienced a percentage
increase in FDI levels exceeding 5600%; Oman and Qatar, on the other hand,
experienced percentage increases in FDI inflows similar to those of other
major petroleum and gas exporters, with 836% and 648% increases,
respectively. Bahrain experienced a net percentage decline of twenty eight
percent in FDI inflows.52

50
51
52

See infra Table 8.
UNCTAD, FDI Statistics, supra note 2.
See id.
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Table 9. Inward FDI Flows—Individual GCC Member States53
2002*
2010*
Percentage Increase
Bahrain
$217
$156
-28.11%
Kuwait
$4
$319
7875.00%
Oman
$122
$1142
836.07%
Qatar
$624
$4670
648.40%
Saudi Arabia
$453
$28,105
6104.19%
UAE
$95
$5500
5689.47%
*Measure: In millions of U.S. dollars at July 12, 2012, prices and exchange rates.

The data reinforces the fact that Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE
dramatically outperformed other major petroleum and gas exporters in terms of
percentage increase in FDI flows between 2002 and 2010, suggesting again
that such increases in FDI inflows cannot be explained solely by the increase in
the price of oil.54
Although the percentage increase of FDI in the GCC between 2002 and
2010 is notable, the levels of FDI inflows should be interpreted as a percentage
of global FDI inflows. Table 10 compares the GCC with eight other regional
economic unions—the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(“SAARC”),55 Economic Cooperation Organization (“ECO”),56 Association of
South-East Asian Nations (“ASEAN”),57 Central American Common Market
(“CACM”),58 Southern African Customs Union (“SACU”),59 Economic
Community of West African States (“ECOWAS”),60 Commonwealth of
Independent States (“CIS”),61 and European Free Trade Association
(“EFTA”)62—with roughly the same63 combined percentage of global FDI
inflows in 2002.
53

Id.
See supra Table 9.
55 Member states include: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri
Lanka. UNCTAD, FDI Statistics, supra note 2.
56 Member states include: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan,
Turkey, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Id.
57 Member states include: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia,
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Id.
58 Member states include: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Id.
59 Member states include: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland. Id.
60 Member states include: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. Id.
61 Member states include: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Republic of Moldova,
Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Id.
62 Member states include: Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland. Id.
54
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Table 10. Inward FDI Flows as a Percentage of Total Global FDI Inflows—
Regional Economic Unions64

Table 10 demonstrates that although the GCC countries experienced a marked
rise in FDI as a percentage of global FDI inflows between 2002 and 2008, in
2010 the GCC countries continue to lag behind other regional economic
unions, such as ASEAN and CIS, in the total share of world FDI inflows.
Table 10 should be examined, however, in light of the GDP to FDI inflow
ratio. In other words, although ASEAN and CIS enjoy a larger share of global
FDI inflows, they also boast much larger GDPs. Table 11 reveals that among
the other eight regional economic unions, the GCC ranks similar to ASEAN,
ECOWAS, CIS, and EFTA in FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP during
2010.

63 Id. ASEAN nations had noticeably more FDI inflows in 2002 than the other regional economic unions.
See infra Table 10.
64 UNCTAD, FDI Statistics, supra note 2.
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Table 11. FDI of the GCC as a Percentage of GDP Ratio—Other Regional
Economic Unions65
2010 GDP
2010 FDI Inflows*
GDP to FDI Ratio
GCC
$1,080,915
$39,892
3.69%
SAARC
$2,047,966
$28,098
1.37%
ECO
$1,526,99466
$31,932
2.09%
ASEAN
$1,814,69567
$92,733
5.11%
CACM
$149,098
$3694
2.48%
SACU
$395,438
$2690
0.68%
ECOWAS
$309,358
$11,695
3.78%
CIS
$1,828,642
$68,966
3.77%
EFTA
$964,52468
$38,145
3.95%
*Measure: In millions of U.S. dollars at July 12, 2012, prices and exchange rates.

The GCC’s GDP to FDI ratio is also higher than those of Brazil, Russia,
India, and China (“BRIC”), as shown in Table 12.
Table 12. GCC FDI as a Percentage of GDP Ratio—BRIC Countries

69

2010 GDP
$1,080,915
$2,143,035
$1,487,515
$1,684,323
$5,930,529

2010 Inward FDI*
FDI as a % of GDP Ratio
GCC
$39,892
3.69%
Brazil
$48,506
2.26%
Russia
$43,288
2.91%
India
$24,159
1.43%
China
$114,734
1.93%
*Measure: In millions of U.S. dollars at July 12, 2012, prices and exchange rates.

With the exception of Bahrain and Kuwait, the individual GCC member
states boasted comparatively high FDI to GDP ratios in 2010, with Saudi
Arabia and Qatar each outperforming the global average.70

65 Id.; Data: GDP, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (last visited
Oct. 24, 2012) [hereinafter World Bank GDP Statistics].
66 The 2010 data from Iran, a member of ECO, is not available. The 2009 figure is used for the 2010
ECO calculations. See World Bank GDP Statistics, supra note 65.
67 Data for ASEAN does not include the 2010 GDP figures for Myanmar, for which no data is available.
See id.
68 The 2010 data from Liechtenstein is not available. The 2009 figure is used instead. See id.
69 World Bank GDP Statistics, supra note 65; UNCTAD, FDI Statistics, supra note 2.
70 See Data: Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (% of GDP), THE WORLD BANK, http://data.
worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZS (last visited Nov. 2, 2012).
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B. Foreign Stock Investments in GCC Member States, 2002–2010.71
In addition to experiencing a dramatic percentage increase in the inward
flow of FDI from 2002 to 2010, the GCC also experienced similar rises in
foreign stock investments during the same period.72 UNCTAD defines FDI
stock as “the value of the share of . . . capital and reserves (including retained
profits) attributable to the parent enterprise, plus the net indebtedness of
affiliates to the parent enterprise.”73 Table 13 compares the percentage increase
of foreign stock investments in the GCC to the same economies against which
the inflows of FDI to the GCC were compared in Tables 1 through 8 above.74
75

Table 13. Inward Foreign Direct Investment of Stock—Global Sample

GCC
World
Developing Economies
Transition Economies
Developed Economies
Developing Economies: Africa
Developing Economies:
America
Developing Economies: Asia
Developing Economies: Oceania
Developing Economies
excluding LDCs
Developing Economies
excluding China
LDCs
High-income developing
countries
71

2002*

2010*

Percentage
Increase

$31,435
$7,501,217
$1,730,852
$115,419
$5,654,947
$166,535

$319,347
$19,906,662
$6,256,066
$759,687
$12,890,909
$561,354

915.90%
165.38%
261.44%
558.20%
127.96%
237.08%

$529,011
$1,032,560
$2746

$1,963,581
$3,716,491
$14,641

271.18%
259.93%
433.18%

$1,680,543

$6,114,917

263.87%

$1,514,349
$50,309

$5,668,249
$141,149

274.30%
180.56%

$1,032,562

$3,506,051

239.55%

UNCTAD, Foreign Stock Statistics, supra note 4.
Id.
73 WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2009, supra note 35, at 243. M. Sornarajah defines FDI stock (“portfolio
investment”) as “a movement of money for the purpose of buying shares in a company formed or functioning
in another country. It could also include other security instruments through which capital is raised for
ventures.” M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 8 (3d ed. 2010). As
Sornarajah points out, the “distinguishing element” between foreign investment and portfolio investment “is
that, in portfolio investment, there is a separation between, on the one hand, management and control of the
company and, on the other, the share of ownership in it.” Id.
74 See UNCTAD, Foreign Stock Statistics, supra note 4; supra Tables 1–8.
75 UNCTAD, Foreign Stock Statistics, supra note 4.
72
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Middle-income developing
countries
Low-income developing
countries
Major Oil and Gas Exporters
Major Oil/Gas Exporters:
Developing Economies
Major Oil/Gas Exporters:
Transition Economies
Major Oil/Gas Exporters:
Developed Economies
Emerging Economies
Newly Industrialized Asian
Countries
Developing Economies:
Northern Africa
Developing Economies: South
America
Developing Economies: Eastern
Asia
Developing Economies:
Southern Asia
Developing Economies: Western
Asia
Developing Economies: SouthEastern Asia
Northern Africa excluding
Sudan
South American excluding
Brazil
Eastern and South-Eastern Asia
excluding China
Southern Asia excluding India
Arab Maghreb Union (UMA)
ECOWAS (Economic
Community of West African
States)
League of Arab States
OIC
Union of South American
Nations (UNASUR)
NAFTA
OAS
ASEAN
EU

695

$544,513

$2,065,489

279.33%

$153,776
$247,067

$684,526
$1,232,919

345.14%
399.02%

$117,938

$488,589

314.28%

$86,348

$572,414

562.92%

$42,781
$648,364

$171,916
$2,181,366

301.85%
236.44%

$664,794

$2,161,714

225.17%

$55,823

$205,013

267.26%

$273,248.8

$1,121,226

310.33%

$650,076

$1,888,439

190.50%

$43,797

$266,641

508.81%

$65,188

$587,781

801.67%

$273,499

$973,631

255.99%

$53,138

$184,902

247.97%

$172,386

$446,462

158.99%

$707,073
$17,970
$32,317

$2,274,252
$61,949
$114,169

221.64%
244.74%
253.28%

$37,334
$102,582
$251,313

$92,529
$610,633
$1,335,459

147.84%
495.26%
431.41%

$273,173
$2,387,371
$2,708,253
$273,499
$2,958,992

$1,121,150
$4,312,153
$5,563,412
$973,489
$7,289,629

310.42%
80.62%
105.42%
255.94%
146.36%
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APEC
$3,684,916
$8,612,891
133.73%
G8
$3,793,728
$7,925,909
108.92%
G20
$4,606,969
$11,098,916
140.92%
G77
$1,443,012
$5,244,344
263.43%
*Measure: In millions of U.S. dollars at July 12, 2012, prices and exchange rates.

As indicated in Table 13, only the group of developing economies in
Western Asia (801.67%) comes close to the GCC’s 915.9% increase of foreign
stock. While foreign stock purchases are not as impactful on the economy of
the host state as regular FDI inflows, they nonetheless represent international
investor confidence in the host state’s legal structure, institutional quality,
economic stability, and economic growth,76 all of which also factor into regular
FDI.
Table 14 illustrates the percentage increase in foreign stock investments for
individual GCC member states.
Table 14. Inward Foreign Direct Investment of Stock in GCC Member States77
Percentage
2002*
2010*
Increase
Bahrain
$6203
$15,154
144.30%
Kuwait
$444
$11,235
2430.41%
Oman
$1874
$14,217
658.64%
Qatar
$2831
$30,564
979.62%
Saudi Arabia
$17,734
$170,450
861.15%
UAE
$2348
$77,727
3210.35%
*Measure: In millions of U.S. dollars at July 12, 2012, prices and exchange rates.

C. FDI Trends Since 2010
Data regarding global FDI levels during 2011 was recently released by
UNCTAD, revealing that FDI inflows in the GCC decreased in 2011 by thirtyfive percent.78 FDI inflows decreased from roughly forty billion U.S. dollars in
2010 to roughly twenty-six billion U.S. dollars in 201179—levels not seen

76 See World Development Indicators Data: Financial Sector, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/
about/world-development-indicators-data/financial-sector (last visited Nov. 15, 2012).
77 UNCTAD, Foreign Stock Statistics, supra note 4.
78 UNCTAD, FDI Statistics, supra note 2.
79 Id.
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since 2005.80 Nonetheless, some individual GCC countries have seen
increases81 and some projections for future FDI levels are positive.82
For the purposes of the present study, the decreases in FDI levels since
2010 do not alter the scholarly value of the dramatic upsurge in FDI between
2002 and 2010, as scholars can still make nuanced assessments of the
relationship between increased levels of FDI and economic growth with the
available data. The decrease in FDI since 2009 constitutes a marked shift in
FDI patterns over the past decade.83 This decrease may actually enable
scholars to ascertain more definitively the relationship, if any, between FDI
levels and both short-term and, in particular, long-term economic growth.
More pronounced FDI trends such as this are a boon when examining the very
delicate statistical correlation between FDI levels and economic growth.
Overall, between 2002 and 2010, FDI in the GCC—both through regular
FDI channels as well as foreign stock investments—increased dramatically, at
a pace that rivals other developing, transitioning, and emerging economies.84
The percentage increase of FDI in the GCC was markedly higher than that of
the rest of the world, even following the 2008 global financial crisis, which hit
the UAE particularly hard.85 While FDI inflows into the GCC still constitute a
relatively small portion of global FDI flows, FDI inflows and FDI as a
percentage of GDP indicate that the GCC has relatively strong locational
determinants,86 making the GCC markets an attractive option for foreign
investors.87
80

Id.
Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE saw increases in FDI in 2011. Id. (using data from the GCC table).
82 See, e.g., Pratap John, Qatar Projects Set To Boost FDI Flows into GCC, GULF TIMES (July 15, 2012),
at 1; USD 500 Billion Expected Surpluses for GCC Countries in 2012, KUWAIT NEWS AGENCY (Aug. 10,
2012), http://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=2257144&language=en.
83 UNCTAD, World Investment Prospects Survey: 2009–2011, 9, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/8
(2009).
84 See supra Table 12.
85 MAY KHAMIS ET AL., IMF, IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON THE GULF COOPERATION
COUNCIL COUNTRIES AND CHALLENGES AHEAD 16, 19, 21 (2010), available at http://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/dp/2010/dp1001.pdf.
86 See JOHN H. DUNNING & SARIANNA M. LUNDAN, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 99–103, 323–27 (Edward Elgar Publ’g, 2d ed. 2008) (1993). Some of the locational determinates
that John Dunning lists are input prices, distribution of resources, transportation and communication costs,
investment incentives, trade barriers, infrastructure, and the legal and regulatory system. Id. at 101–02 box 4.1.
These factors can affect whether a corporation decides to engage in FDI in a particular country. Id. at 100.
Locational determinants are a subset of Dunning’s ownership-location-internalization paradigm. Id. at 99–100.
87 Mohammed Elsidafy, GCC Remains an Attractive Option for Foreign Capital, EMIRATES 24/7 (Feb.
16, 2009), http://www.emirates247.com/eb247/economy/uae-economy/gcc-remains-an-attractive-option-forforeign-capital-2009-02-16-1.92494.
81
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III. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING FDI IN THE GCC
One of the primary factors behind the upsurge in FDI inflows has been the
removal of legal and regulatory barriers to FDI. State-led reforms—initiated in
some GCC states as far back as the 1980s, but systematically adopted by GCC
states around 2000—opened the door to FDI in the GCC.88 Concomitant to
such reforms, however, was a deliberate exercise of regulatory authority by
GCC states over strategic elements of their respective FDI regimes.89 Although
each GCC member state has legislated its own FDI regime,90 enough
similarities exist between the FDI regimes of individual member states to
warrant a brief, thematic overview of FDI policies in the GCC.
Part III.A examines the neoliberal policies governing several aspects of the
FDI regimes of GCC states. Part III.B outlines a few prominent ways in which
GCC states have maintained or asserted regulatory control over strategic
aspects of their FDI regimes in spite of otherwise neoliberal reforms.
A. Neoliberal Economic Policies in GCC Member States’ FDI Regimes
In the past decade, GCC members states—as well as other MENA states—
have modified their investment laws (UAE, Oman) or created new ones
altogether (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia).91 These reforms have revolved around the
standards promoted by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (“OECD”), codified most recently in the 2006 MENA–OECD
Investment Programme.92 The following sections briefly examine some of the
principle reforms undertaken by GCC states.

88

See Hussein, supra note 10, at 363.
See id.
90 For state-specific analyses, see, for example, K. Mellahi et al., Motives for Foreign Direct Investment
in Oman, 45 THUNDERBIRD INT’L BUS. REV. 431 (2003); see also, e.g., AL-KHALIFA, supra note 18.
91 See Mellahi, supra note 90, at 433. See also Kuwait Eyes New ‘Investment Law,’ ARAB TIMES KUWAIT
ENG. DAILY, http://www.arabtimesonline.com/NewsDetails/tabid/96/smid/414/ArticleID/164499/reftab/73/
Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 12, 2012); Lucia Dore, UAE Foreign Investment Law by 2008, KHALEEJ TIMES
(Mar. 23, 2007), http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=data/business/2007/March/
business_March639.xml&section=business; New Foreign Investment Law, SAUDI ARABIA MARKET INFO.
RESOURCE & DIRECTORY, http://www.saudinf.com/main/c552.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2012).
92 MENA INVESTMENT POLICY AGENDA, supra note 10; see also OECD, MENA–OECD INVESTMENT
PROGRAMME: MINISTERIAL DECLARATION AND RELATED DOCUMENTS (2006), available at http://www.oecd.
org/mena/investment/37520012.pdf.
89
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1. Diversification
It is no secret that the six labor-rich states of the GCC all depend on oil and
gas for government revenues and foreign investment. Qatar is one of the
world’s top exporters of liquefied natural gas, while the GCC states hold
roughly thirty percent of the world’s oil reserves, seventeen percent of the
world’s gas reserves, and GCC production of oil accounts for more than twenty
percent of global production.93 Oil and gas, in this sense, are the engine of the
GCC economy, and the GCC will continue to utilize its unique resources as
leverage in its continued economic growth.94
As outlined above, FDI inflows into the GCC during the second oil boom
increased at a rate higher than rates in other major petroleum and gas
producing economies.95 As Table 15 indicates, however, the rate at which FDI
inflows within individual GCC member states increased from 2002 to 2008
was substantially higher than the rates of increase for the other top twenty-five
oil-producing countries in the world during this same period.
Table 15. FDI Inflows Among Top 2596 Oil-Producing States (2002 & 2008)97
Saudi Arabia
Russia
US
Iran
China
Canada
Mexico
UAE
Nigeria

93

2002
$453
$3461
$74,501
$3657
$52,743
$22,155
$23,883
$95
$2040

2008
$38,151
$75,002
$306,366
$1909
$108,312
$57,177
$27,140
$13,724
$8249

Percentage Increase
8321.85%
2067.06%
311.22%
-47.80%
105.36%
158.08%
13.88%
14,346.32%
304.36%

BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2012, supra note 29, at 4, 6, 20.
Contra M. Nagy Eltony, The Future Role of Gulf Oil in World Energy Demand, in ARAB BUSINESS:
THE GLOBALIZATION IMPERATIVE 92, 104 (Ali Al-Shamali & John Denton eds., 2000) (arguing that GCC
countries should diversify their economies instead of relying on their oil reserves).
95 See supra Table 8.
96 The World Factbook: Oil-Production, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/rankorder/2173rank.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2012). Iraq, which ranks ninth among oil-producing
states, was excluded from this list for this Article due to the events associated with the Iraq War and their
impact on FDI inflows during the early stages of the Iraq War. Id. Bahrain is ranked as the sixty-third highest
oil producing state. Id.
97 UNCTAD, FDI Statistics, supra note 2.
94
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$4
$782
$16,590
$312,003
$791
$1065
$1672
$145
$2,590
$624
$24,029
$1392
$189699
$5630
$122
$217

$-6
$1195
$45,058
$542,242
$10,564
$2594
$1679
$3180
$14,322
$3779
$91,489
$14
$9318
$43,406
$2952
$1794
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-250.00%
52.81%
171.60%
73.79%
1235.52%
143.57%
0.42%
2093.10%
452.97%
505.61%
280.74%
-98.99%
391.46%
670.98%
2319.67%
726.73%

Average increase of all GCC states (including Bahrain) 4328.36%
Overall average increase: (excluding Bahrain)
1400.98%
Overall average increase of all non-GCC producers:
419.01%
*Measure: In millions of U.S. dollars at July 12, 2012, prices and exchange rates.

Oil prices, adjusted for inflation, increased from $29.12 in 2002 to $97.33 in
2008, for an increase of 234%.100 Table 15 reveals that the average overall
increase in FDI inflows among the top twenty-five non-GCC oil-producing
states was roughly 594%. The average percentage increase during the same
period for GCC member states was 4328%, suggesting that both oil and nonoil sectors benefitted from increased FDI.101
A brief overview of the diversification efforts by GCC member states
reveals that, indeed, the non-oil sector has benefitted from increased FDI
inflows as a result of several changes instituted by GCC member states. GCC
countries have reduced the number of sectors that were previously closed to

98

In 2007, Kuwait’s FDI was $112 million. Id. In 2009, its FDI was $1114 million, which constitutes a
27,750% increase. See id.
99 $1896 million is the 2004 figure.
100 Historical Crude Oil Prices (Table), INFLATIONDATA.COM, http://inflationdata.com/Inflation/
Inflation_Rate/Historical_Oil_Prices_Table.asp (last visited Oct. 12, 2012).
101 See supra Table 15.

TOONE GALLEYSPROOFS2

2012]

5/28/2013 1:09 PM

MIRAGE IN THE GULF

701

foreign investors.102 Foreign investors may now invest in a broad range of
sectors, including tourism, renewable energy,103 energy and feedstockintensive heavy industries, education, real estate, environmental technologies
and financial instruments, petrochemicals, infrastructure, health and medicine,
construction, transportation (including railways), agriculture, food and
beverages, mining,104 services,105 banking and financial services, airline, steel,
transportation,
pharmaceuticals,106
satellite-transmission
services,107
wholesale/distribution, and telecommunications.108
Privatization efforts have also been successful.109 In Oman, the
privatization process was inaugurated by royal decree in 1996.110 Among other
things, the law “unbundl[es] and corporatiz[es] the ministry’s existing
activities into a number of separate generation, transmission, and distribution
businesses, which will be initially owned by the government and then
privatized.”111 Abu Dhabi has been particularly active on the privatization
front, most notably in the domain of water and electricity, where the Abu
Dhabi Water and Electricity Company has balanced demand and supply of
water and electricity through sales contracts and Bulk Supply Tarriffs with the
distribution companies.112

102

See Saif, supra note 16, at 5.
See, e.g., Veronica Cinti, The Countries’ Growth Beyond Oil: The Special Case of Saudi Arabia, 1
WORLD REV. BUS. RES. 136, 149 (2011); Reem Shamseddine, Renewables To Contribute to Saudi Power Mix,
REUTERS, Oct. 21, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/21/us-mideast-summit-saudipower-idUSTRE69J2OF20101021.
104 Moin Siddiqi, MENA—The Heaven of Foreign Direct Investment, GLOBAL ARAB NETWORK (June 2,
2009),
http://www.english.globalarabnetwork.com/200906021019/Economics/mena-the-heaven-of-foreigndirect-investment.html.
105 Uri Dadush & Lauren Falcao, Regional Arrangements in the Arabian Gulf, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT
FOR INT’L PEACE (2009), http://carnegieendowment.org/files/gcc1.pdf.
106 GCC Looking To Expand Its Horizons, PHARMA & HEALTHCARE (Mar. 2007), http://www.
pharmaceuticalsinsight.com/file/43716/gcc-looking-to-expand-its-horizons.html.
107 Siddiqi, supra note 104.
108 E.g., UGO FASANO & ZUBAIR IQBAL, GCC COUNTRIES: FROM OIL INDEPENDENCE TO DIVERSIFICATION
14 (2003).
109 See GLOBAL INVESTMENT HOUSE, GCC MACROECONOMIC—CHANGING PARADIGMS 7, 19 (2009)
(illustrating the FDI inflows into non-oil sectors of the GCC economy).
110 See Oman: Action Plan, BUS. MIDDLE E., Nov. 1–15, 1996, at 4.
111 Loren Page Ambinder et al., The Mirage Becomes Reality: Privatization and Project Finance
Developments in the Middle East Power Market, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1029, 1032 n.19 (2001).
112 ABU DHABI WATER & ELECTRICITY COMPANY, http://www.adwec.ae (last visited Oct. 12, 2012); see
also Ambinder et al., supra note 111, at 1035. ADWEC is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Abu Dhabi Water
and Electricity Authority. ABU DHABI WATER & ELECTRICITY COMPANY, supra.
103
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The Saudi Government recently announced that it would split the Saudi
Electric Company, currently the largest utility provider in the Gulf, into “four
independent power generation companies to encourage more competition.”113
Several investment opportunities and joint venture projects with the Saudi
Electric Company have also been announced.114
With regards to infrastructure, Saudi Arabia has undertaken vast publicprivate partnerships (“PPPs”) to build a series of “economic cities” throughout
Saudi Arabia.115 Emirates Dubai and Abu Dhabi of the UAE116 have
undertaken similar public-private partnerships, as has Bahrain.117 It has been
said “every third crane in the world is located somewhere in the Gulf and most
of them are deployed in Dubai alone.”118
Economic diversification efforts throughout the gulf have opened up the
Gulf economies to domestic and foreign investment, expanding the
governments’ sources of revenue to several non-oil sectors.119
2. Trade
It has been generally established in the literature that trade openness has a
positive impact on the FDI inflow.120 Indeed, it seems apparent that increased
trade openness and developed trading ties encourage FDI.121 Following a
decade of protracted negotiations, Saudi Arabia acceded to the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”) in 2005, “making it the last GCC country to enter the
global free trade framework.”122 Since then, GCC countries have continued to
113 Saudi Electricity Company, ARABIANBUSINESS, http://www.arabianbusiness.com/companies/saudielectricity-company-66578.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2012).
114 Investment Opportunities, SAUDI ELECTRICITY COMPANY, http://www.se.com.sa/SEC/English/Menu/
Partners/chances/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2012).
115 E.g., P.K. Abdul Ghafour, Economic Cities Draw Foreign Investment: SAGIA Chief, ARABNEWS
(Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.arabnews.com/node/356295.
116 See, e.g., Think Science Contest Invites Emirati Scientific Talents, EDARABIA, http://www.edarabia.
com/60560/think-science-contest-invites-emirati-scientific-talents (last visited Oct. 12, 2012)
117 See, e.g., Abdul-Haq Mohammed, Can Public Private Partnerships Solve Bahrain’s Housing Crisis?,
GUARDIAN (Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/housing-network/2012/feb/15/public-privatepartnership-bahrain-housing.
118 Mahmood Rafique, GCC’s Energy Sector to Keep Attracting FDI, ARABNEWS (Dec. 6, 2007), http://
www.arabnews.com/node/306451.
119 See Dania Saadi, Gulf States Move to Diversify Income Sources, N.Y. TIMES, (July 18, 2012), http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/07/19/world/middleeast/gulf-states-move-to-diversify-income-sources.html.
120 Mina, Are the GCC FDI Location Determinants Favorable?, supra note 10, at 13.
121 Id. at 12–13.
122 Jasim Ali, GCC Focus: Attracting FDI Calls for an Attitude Shift, GULF NEWS (Aug. 3, 2011), http://
gulfnews.com/business/economy/gcc-focus-attracting-fdi-calls-for-an-attitude-shift-1.846327.
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expand their trade relationships. In April 2008, for example, the GCC finalized
negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement (“FTA”) with the European Free
Trade Association.123 In addition to trade agreements that individual GCC
member states have with other trading partners, the GCC has entered into FTA
negotiations with other regional economic unions, including the EU.124
The GCC has a large trade deficit in comparison to other emerging
economies (more imports than exports).125 Nonetheless, the GCC has adopted
a relatively open trade policy.126 This manifests the dependence and
incorporation of GCC economies in the international market,127 a factor that
favorably influences FDI inflows.128
Given their strategic geographic location, GCC states will remain attractive
trading partners. Although intra-GCC trade has been lacking,129 GCC states
have not shied away from promoting open trade policies.130 Such policies have
reinforced FDI in the GCC member states, 131 and will continue to do so as the
GCC states continue to open their borders to intra-GCC and global trading
partners.
GCC states—especially the two principal emirates, Dubai and Abu Dhabi,
in the UAE—have also enjoyed widespread success in the creation and
management of free trade zones (“FTZ”).132 Dubai’s FTZ, for example, is
highly sophisticated, enabling thousands of international businesses to conduct

123 The EFTA States and GCC Sign Free Trade Agreement, EFTA (June 22, 2009), http://www.efta.int/
free-trade/free-trade-news/2009-06-22-efta-gcc-sign-fta.aspx.
124 International Affairs-Free Trade Agreements, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/
policies/international/facilitating-trade/free-trade/ (last updated Feb. 2, 2012).
125 Aysu İnsel & Mahmut Tekçe, Bilateral Trade Flows of the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries: A
New Approach to Gravity Model, TOPICS MIDDLE E. & N. AFR. ECONOMIES 16 (Sept. 2009), http://www.luc.
edu/orgs/meea/volume11/PDFS/Paper-by-Insel&Tekce.pdf (article published in volume 11 of the online
journal Topics in Middle Eastern and North African Economies).
126 See ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE GCC, supra note 22, 17, 18 fig.7.
127 Id.
128 Mina, Are the GCC FDI Location Determinants Favorable?, supra note 10, at 12–13.
129 See, e.g., Joel Bowman, Intra-GCC Trade Still Problematic for Many, ARABIANBUSINESS (Apr. 8,
2008, 12:34 PM), http://www.arabianbusiness.com/intra-gcc-trade-still-problematic-for-many-51140.html. But
see Dadush & Falcao, supra note 105, at 2 (“Many of the GCC’s efforts have thus far been targeted at
lowering tariffs between member states.”).
130 See supra notes 123–26 and accompanying text.
131 See Dadush & Falcao, supra note 106, at 2, 4.
132 See UAE Freezones: Air and Sea Ports and Free Zones, MAZARS, http://gcc.mazars.com/Home/
(last
Contact-us/Frequently-Asked-Questions/Frequently-Asked-Questions-for-the-UAE/UAE-Freezones
visited Oct. 12, 2012).
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trade and expand their businesses in a comparatively open regulatory
environment.133
3. Bilateral Investment Treaties
As with the relationship between trade and FDI, scholars have examined
the relationship between Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BITs”), and FDI.134 In
general, the conclusion in the literature is that, in the MENA region, BITs play
a part in attracting FDI, although to a lesser extent than trade.135 The leading
determinant for FDI in the MENA region appears to be market size.136
In the GCC specifically, some scholars have come to the conclusion that
“BITs contracted with high-income non-OECD countries, such as Kuwait and
UAE, has a positive FDI influence. . . . On the other hand, BITs contracted
with high-income OECD and upper middle income countries have a negative
FDI influence, while government stability, as a domestic institution, has a
positive influence.”137 Wasseem Mina argues that within GCC countries, “the
rationale for contracting bilateral investment treaties seems controversial and
goes beyond attracting FDI to strengthening bilateral economic and political
relationships . . . .”138 Mina concludes that “the empirical evidence seems to
suggest that institutional development and targeting BIT partners matter for
FDI promotion.”139 The literature also suggests that while BITs serve as an
important impetus for domestic institutional change, the most effective
approach to domestic, FDI-related institutional reform is for MENA states to
pursue such reforms in addition to pursuing BITs with other countries.140

133

See id.
E.g., Peter Egger & Michael Pfaffermayr, The Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Foreign
Direct Investment, 32 J. COMP. ECON. 788 (2004); Rodolphe Desbordes & Vincent Vicard, Foreign Direct
Investment and Bilateral Investment Treaties: An International Political Perspective, 37 J. COMP. ECON. 372
(2009).
135 See Wasseem Michel Mina, Institutional Reforms Debate and FDI Flows to MENA Region: Does One
“Best” Fit All? 10–11 (Ga. State Univ. Andrew Young Sch. of Policy Studies, Working Paper No. 10-34,
2010).
136 Id. at 9.
137 E.g., Wasseem Mina, External Commitment Mechanisms, Institutions, and FDI in GCC Countries, 19
J. INT’L FIN. MARKETS, INSTIUTIONS & MONEY 371, 384 (2009).
138 Id. at 12.
139 Wasseem Mina, BITs Contracting and FDI Impact in the GCC Countries, ECON. RES. FORUM 20
(Oct. 31, 2007), http://www.erf.org.eg/CMS/uploads/pdf/1198317319_BIT_Contracting_FDI_Impact_GCC_
Countries_Wasseem_Mina.pdf.
140 Mina, supra note 137, at 13–14.
134
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As indicated above, the GCC states in general have pursued domestic
institutional reforms independent of BIT obligations.141 GCC states have
generally adopted approaches to reform “national rules and bureaucracies” and
to create FTZs.142 These obligations have been reinforced in GCC BIT
obligations.143 As of June 2008, the GCC has entered into a total of 105
BITs.144
4. Legal Initiatives
Since the early 2000s, GCC member states have instituted several changes
to the legal regimes governing FDI. Saudi Arabia, for example, adopted the
Foreign Investment Law (“FIL”) in 2000, which created the Saudi Arabia
General Investment Authority (“SAGIA”).145 The FIL provides equal tax
treatment to foreign and local investors, permits 100% foreign ownership of
projects, and gives foreign investors access to attractive finance from the Saudi
Industrial Development Fund.146 The FIL also “allows foreign banks to operate
in the form of locally incorporated joint-stock companies or as branches of
international financial institutions.”147 Similar provisions can be found in laws
of Qatar148 and, in the UAE, a proposed Federal Companies Law will allow for
100% foreign ownership in some sectors outside of the FTZ.149

141

See supra Part III.A.1.
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE GCC, supra note 22, at 17.
143 See, e.g., Signature of Bilateral Investment Agreement Between Japan and the State of Kuwait,
MINISTRY ECON., TRADE & INDUSTRY (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2012/0322_03.
html.
144 Mina, supra note 137, at 39.
145 See Investment Incentives: Investment Climate in Saudi Arabia, SAUDI ARABIA GEN. INVEST. AUTH.,
http://www.sagia.gov.sa/Investment-climate/Some-Things-You-Need-To-Know-/Investment-Incentives (last
visited Oct. 12, 2012).
146 Ushering in the New Generation, MEED, Mar. 16, 2001, at 23, 24; accord Jason T. Burdette, Saudi
Law Launches New Investment Era, US–ARAB TRADELINE, Apr. 21, 2000, at 1, 1. But see Taimur Ahmad,
Oman Unveils, PROJECT FIN., Dec. 2000, at 24, 27 (noting that in Oman, the permitted level of foreign
ownership of local companies is sixty-five percent, with the possibility for increases in the future).
147 Ali, supra note 122.
148 See 2012 Investment Climate Statement—Qatar, U.S. DEP’T STATE (June 2012), http://www.state.gov/
e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2012/191221.htm (stating that regulations for foreign and local banks are the same).
149 2012 Investment Climate Statement—United Arab Emirates, U.S. DEP’T STATE (June 2012), http://
www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2012/191258.htm. (“The proposed law may allow 100 percent foreign
ownership in some sectors and projects . . . .”). But see id. (“[T]here are four major laws affecting foreign
investment in the UAE . . . . These laws, especially the Federal Companies Laws, are seen as the largest
obstacles to foreign direct investment in the UAE.”).
142
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GCC governments have also revised their tax codes to facilitate a more
business-friendly market.150 In addition to FTZs, several GCC states have
instituted tax codes that are very friendly to multi-national corporations
(“MNCs”). Kuwait, for example, recently lowered the top marginal tax rate for
foreign corporations from fifty-five percent to fifteen percent.151 Some GCC
states also have tax holidays.152 GCC states have also taken steps to reduce
“bureaucratic red tape,”153 such as expediting the issuance of visas.154 Saudi
Arabia’s establishment of SAGIA, which functions as a one-stop shop for the
application and management of FDI projects in Saudi Arabia,155 is perhaps the
most notable example of reducing administrative and bureaucratic red tape.
SAGIA has been surprisingly successful in facilitating FDI and managing FDI
projects.156 GCC states are also increasingly respecting a broad array of private
property rights, including allowing 100% foreign ownership of residential
property and other real estate in select areas.157 GCC states have also taken
steps to eliminate or reduce minimum capital requirements, and have instituted
creative offset programs designed to encourage FDI.158
These changes to the legal and institutional environment governing FDI in
the GCC are reflected in the World Bank’s “Ease of Doing Business”

150 See, e.g., Ahmad, supra note 146, at 27; 2012 Investment Climate Statement—Saudi Arabia, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE (June 2012), http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2012/191229.htm.
151 Corporate Tax by Country, GLOBAL FIN., http://www.gfmag.com/tools/global-database/economicdata/11865-corporate-tax-by-country.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2012).
152 E.g., Oman Highlights 2012, DELOITTE 1, http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-Global/Local%20
Assets/Documents/Tax/Taxation%20and%20Investment%20Guides/2012/dttl_tax_highlight_2012_Oman.pdf
(last visited Oct. 28, 2012); Qatar Highlights 2012, DELOITTE 1, http://www.deloitte.com/assets/DcomGlobal/Local%20Assets/Documents/Tax/Taxation%20and%20Investment%20Guides/2012/dttl_tax_highlight
_2012_Qatar.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2012).
153 Ugo Fasano & Qing Wang, Fiscal Expenditure Policy and Non-Oil Economic Growth: Evidence From
GCC Countries 6 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/01/195, 2001), available at http://www.imf.
org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2001/wp01195.pdf.
154 Mohammed Zaher, FDI Inflows to GCC Below Potential Despite Recent Surge, NAT’L BANK OF
KUWAIT 1, 5 (Nov. 19, 2008), http://www.kuwait.nbk.com/InvestmentAndBrokerage/ResearchandReports/
$Document/GCCResearchNote/en-gb/MainCopy/$UserFiles/GCCResearchnote20081119%20(1).pdf.
155 See What We Do, SAUDI ARABIA GEN. INVEST. AUTH., http://www.sagia.gov.sa/en/SAGIA/What-WeDo/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2012); see also Zaher, supra note 154, at 4–5.
156 Khalil Hanware, Saudi Arabia’s Ability To Attract FDI Becomes a Big Success Story, ARABNEWS
(Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.arabnews.com/node/366416.
157 Zaher, supra note 154, at 4.
158 Id. at 5.

TOONE GALLEYSPROOFS2

2012]

5/28/2013 1:09 PM

MIRAGE IN THE GULF

707

statistics,159 in which GCC member states have consistently improved since
2006.160
Overall, GCC governments have instituted several changes to the legal and
economic structures governing FDI. Legally speaking, the GCC is a much
more open market than it was only ten or fifteen years ago.161 It is less
regulated and more business friendly.162 To be sure, several challenges remain.
Overall, however, the rapid increase in FDI inflows into the GCC can be
attributed in part to the legal and institutional changes adopted by GCC
governments during the past fifteen years.
5. Other
In addition to the foregoing factors, the GCC states have implemented
additional reforms that have contributed to the dramatic upsurge in FDI over
the past decade. To begin with, individual GCC governments have, in general,
embraced prudent money management policies, and have utilized government
surpluses wisely.163 Large government surpluses have enabled GCC
governments to limit debt164 and generate additional revenue, through
sovereign wealth funds, loans, and foreign investment in other economies.165
This has not only given GCC states disproportionate influence in international
money markets, but has contributed to the overall image of a fiscally
responsible and solvent GCC.166 It has also enabled the GCC to much more

159 Economy Rankings, DOING BUS.–WORLD BANK GROUP, http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings (last
visited Oct. 28, 2012).
160 See Distance to Frontier, DOING BUS.–WORLD BANK GROUP http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/
distance-to-frontier (last visited Oct. 28, 2012).
161 See Zaher, supra note 154, at 4–5.
162 See supra Part III.A.
163 See Zaher, supra note 154, at 3. The overseas capital resources of the Gulf bourgeoisie are estimated to
be roughly $800 billion. Steffen Hertog, The GCC and Arab Economic Integration: A New Paradigm, 14
MIDDLE E. POL’Y 52, 64 (2007).
164 WORLD ECON. FORUM, ARAB WORLD COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2011–2012, at 54 fig.8 (2011).
165 See GCC in 2020: Outlook for the Gulf and the Global Economy, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT 14–
15 (Mar. 2009), http://graphics.eiu.com/marketing/pdf/Gulf2020.pdf.
166 Hertog, supra note 26, at 6 (“Total foreign asset holdings held by the Gulf states are estimated at
amount 1.6 trillion $ [sic]. Compare this with China’s foreign exchange reserves of 1.1 trillion—so far the
main concern of economists worried about global imbalances. The figures indicate that the Gulf has become
arguably the most important player on international currency markets, and one of the most important sources
of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the world economy. Investment decisions made in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi or
Kuwait City can have a strong influence on the fate of whole currencies and national economies—including
European ones. Recent concerns about the uncoupling of GCC currencies from the US dollar have highlighted
the issue.”).
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effectively reduce oil price fluctuations167—historically the GCC’s Achilles’
heel when it came to sustained growth and development.168
GCC governments have also utilized tax and subsidies effectively,169
enabling GCC governments to escape the lingering problems facing other
MENA economies,170 and contributing to per capita incomes that are among
the highest in the world.171
The GCC as a whole has also facilitated FDI by promoting the free
movement of capital and currency conversion with fixed rates.172 Although
Oman, Qatar, and the UAE have all experienced relatively high inflation rates,
Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia managed to keep inflation rates below
seven percent in 2009, with Bahrain experiencing an inflation rate of only
3.6%.173 The economic turmoil in Dubai in 2008 and 2009 notwithstanding,
the GCC has enjoyed relatively stable economic growth,174 which has been
supported by relative political stability,175 although the recent unrest in
Bahrain176 suggests that the GCC is not immune from the wave of discontent
that has manifested itself throughout the Middle East over the past two years.
All indicators, however, point to continued political stability in the GCC
countries.
Additionally, the GCC has marketed itself very well. From available
investment opportunities to cutting-edge financial tools, the GCC has shown

167

Zaher, supra note 154, at 3.
FASANO & IQBAL, supra note 108, at 3; see also WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2012, supra note 5, at
50–51 box II.2.
169 See FASANO & IQBAL, supra note 108, at 1; Raphael Espinoza, Government Spending, Subsidies and
Economic Efficiency in the GCC 2 (OxCarre, Research Paper No. 95, 2012).
170 Anthony O’Sullivan et al., Opportunities and Challenges in the MENA Region, ORG. ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. 2 (2011), http://www.oecd.org/mena/investment/49036903.pdf.
171 The World Factbook: Country Comparison: GDP—Per Capita (PPP), CIA, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2012).
172 WORLD BANK MENA DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 9, at 100.
173 GLOBAL INVESTMENT HOUSE, supra note 109, at 6.
174 Masood Ahmed, GCC: Crisis Highlights Policy Challenges, INT’L ECON. BULL.–CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Mar. 18, 2010), http://carnegieendowment.org/2010/03/18/gcc-crisishighlights-policy-challenges/3w84#.
175 Abdulkhaleq Abdullah Repercussions of the Arab Spring on GCC States, ARAB CENTER RES. & POL’Y
STUD. 6–7 (May 2012), http://english.dohainstitute.org/file/pdfViewer/5b1fafdb-19d4-4946-a18e-f3115c6fd0
aa.pdf.
176 Bahrain Protest Continues, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 21, 2011), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/
2011/02/2011220211947585788.html.
168
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the world it is an attractive destination for FDI.177 The GCC’s advanced
physical infrastructure goes far in conveying to the world the modern amenities
and opportunities available for foreign investors in the Gulf region.178
B. Anti-Liberal Trends in GCC FDI Regimes
The upsurge in FDI in the last decade is due in large part to the liberal
reforms initiated by GCC member states. GCC states have, however,
maintained notable levels of regulatory control over strategic aspects of their
respective FDI regimes.179 Although each state has adopted unique approaches
to preserving control over various aspects of their FDI regimes, a few
noteworthy generalizations can be made.
To begin with, GCC member states have maintained significant levels of
regulatory control over labor policy. In general, GCC states all embrace labor
regulations that are very favorable to local employees insofar as they seek to
encourage all economic enterprises to employ domestic labor and to protect
domestic employees.180 Both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, for example, have
adopted indigenous worker requirements (officially referred to as “Saudiization” and “Kuwaiti-zation”), which require foreign entities to employ a
certain percentage of Saudi or Kuwaiti employees among their labor force.181
In Saudi Arabia, the official requirement is seventy-five percent—that is,
seventy-five percent of all employees must be Saudi citizens.182
GCC member states also have very strict requirements for employee
training, compensation, and termination. Employment is considered a basic
right in GCC states,183 and laws are designed to ensure that employees are
protected from circumstances that infringe upon this right or otherwise prevent
177 See, e.g., Why Invest in Dubai?, GOV’T DUBAI http://www.dha.gov.ae/En/sectorsdirectorates/
directorates/healthregulation/healthcareinvestment/pages/whyinvestindubai.aspx (last visited Oct. 28, 2012).
178 See, e.g., id.
179 See generally MENA–OECD Investment Programme Investment Climate and Regulation of
International Investment in MENA Countries, ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (2005), http://www.oecd.
org/mena/investment/36086643.pdf (discussing the investment climate in the MENA region).
180 See Nasra M. Shah, RECENT LABOR IMMIGRATION POLICIES IN THE OIL RICH GULF: HOW EFFECTIVE
ARE THEY LIKELY TO BE? 9–11 (2008), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/asro/bangkok/
library/download/pub08-12.pdf.
181 See id.
182 2012 Investment Climate Statement–Saudi Arabia, supra note 150. Based on the author’s personal
experience, companies only rarely reach forty percent in practice.
183 See, e.g., Labor Law, Royal Decree No. 51, 23 Sha’ban 1426 [Sept. 27, 2005] art. 3 (Saudi Arabia),
available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/MONOGRAPH/74429/81285/F969265747/SAU74429%
20English.pdf.
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this right from being fully realized, whether it is through lack of training,
insufficient compensation, or unlawful termination. Thus, Saudi labor law, for
example, provides that each employer “prepare his Saudi workers and enhance
their technical, administrative, vocational and other skills for the purpose of
gradually replacing non-Saudis.”184 As for compensation, employers may not
work employees over the maximum statutory limit (no more than eight hours
per day, or six during Ramadan) without providing overtime pay, which is
calculated at fifty percent of basic pay.185 Employees all receive paid time off
for a “weekly rest day,” official holidays, and sick leaves.186 Employees also
have twenty-one days of prepaid annual leave, thirty if the employee has
worked for the employer for five or more consecutive years.187 Employees may
not be required to perform work that is essentially different from the work for
which they were hired.188 Further, employment contracts renew upon the
termination date of the contract unless otherwise agreed to by the parties.189
As for termination, with only few exceptions,190 the employer is severely
restricted in their ability to terminate an employee.191 Also, Saudi labor law
provides for an “end of service award,” which is defined as follows:
Upon the end of the work relation, the employer shall pay the worker
an end-of-service award of a half-month wage for each of the first
five years and a one-month wage for each of the following years. The
end-of-service award shall be calculated on the basis of the last wage
and the worker shall be entitled to an end-of-service award for the
192
portions of the year in proportion to the time spent on the job.

The employer must pay an end of service reward tied to length of employment
even when an employee resigns.193
Employers also have other wide-ranging responsibilities including: health
care, schooling requirements, mosque access, protections for women, and

184
185
186

Id. art. 42.
Id. arts. 98, 107.
See id. arts. 104(2), 107(3), 117. All hours worked during official holidays are overtime hours. Id. art.

107(3).
187
188
189
190
191
192
193

Id. art. 109(1).
Id. art. 60.
Id. art. 55.
Id. art. 80.
Id. arts. 74(1), 75, 80, 82.
Id. art. 84.
Id. art. 85.
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literacy programs for employees living away from urban centers.194 Moreover,
all employment contracts remain in effect in the event of a change in
ownership, either through sale, merger, partition, or any other restructuring,
and both the predecessor and successor owners are jointly liable for all wages
owed to employees prior to the change in ownership.195 Wages owed to
employees are considered “first-rate privileged debts” in the event of
bankruptcy or liquidation.196 The high standard of living of domestic workers
and the dearth of unions add to the GCC member states’ success in maintaining
regulatory control over labor.197 Overall, considering cheap labor is often a
catalyst to increased levels of FDI,198 the GCC’s success in attracting FDI is
notable given its rather strict labor policies.
In addition to labor law, GCC member states have maintained high levels
of control over select sectors of their economies, most notably the oil and gas
sectors. GCC states have enacted advanced regulatory frameworks governing
the exploration, extraction, and refinement of natural resources, and all
concession agreements must comply with these regulations.199 Abu Dhabi, for
example, established the Supreme Petroleum Council (“SPC”), which is:
[T]he highest authority responsible for the petroleum affairs in the
Emirate of Abu Dhabi, laying down the Emirate’s policy and its
objectives in all sectors of the petroleum industry, in addition to
issuing resolutions for implementing its policy, and follow up such
200
resolutions until the achievement of the aspired results.

The SPC oversees the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company and “particularly
implement[s] Law No. (8) of 1978” relating to the preservation of the oil
industry.201
194

Id. art. 146(1)–(6).
Id. art. 18.
196 Id. art. 19.
197 See generally Heather E. Murray, Note, Hope for Reform Springs Eternal: How the Sponsorship
System, Domestic Laws and Tradition Customs Fail to Protect Migrant Domestic Workers in GCC Countries,
45 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 461, 469–70, 472–73 (2012).
198 Nauro F. Campos & Yuko Kinoshita, Why Does FDI Go Where It Goes? New Evidence from the
Transition Economies 9 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/03/228, 2003), available at http://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/wp03228.pdf.
199 See generally Danyel Reiche, Energy Policies of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries—
Possibilities and Limitations of Ecological Modernization in Rentier States, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 2395, 2402
(2010) (“GCC countries have recently adopted a more pro-active approach to addressing environmental issues
on all levels: international, regional, and national.”).
200 Supreme Petroleum Council (SPC), ABU DHABI NAT’L OIL COMPANY, http://www.adnoc.ae/Content.
aspx?newid=24&mid=24 (last visited Oct. 28, 2012).
201 Id.
195
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Saudi Aramco, the national oil company of Saudi Arabia and one of the
most valuable companies in the world,202 operates in accordance with Article
14 of the Saudi Arabia Basic Law of Governance, which states:
All natural resources that God has deposited underground, above
ground, in territorial waters or within the land and sea domains under
the authority of the State, together with revenues of these resources,
shall be the property of the State, as provided by the Law.
The Law shall specify means for exploitation, protection and
development of these resources in the best interest of the State, and
203
its security and economy.

These examples in Saudi Arabia and the UAE show how GCC countries
maintain close state-control over their most valuable industries.
IV. THE UPSURGE IN FDI AND ITS IMPACT ON ECONOMIC GROWTH
The foregoing analysis outlines the upsurge in FDI in the GCC and the
legal regime giving rise to this upsurge.204 Although GCC member states have
adopted FDI regimes rooted in neoliberal economics, they have also
maintained notable control over important sectors of their FDI regimes,
including labor policy and the exploitation and management of natural
resources.205 This control has enabled GCC states to ensure protections for
GCC nationals and to ensure that state resources are utilized and allocated
efficiently.206
The question, however, remains: To what extent has the increase in FDI
benefited the GCC economies? The assumption, of course, is that increased

202 Stephen Simpson, Apple, Google and the Six Hundred Dollar Stock Club, FORBES (Apr. 12, 2006),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2012/04/16/apple-google-and-the-six-hundred-dollar-stockclub/ (“Saudis are famously close-lipped about Aramco, but there have been estimates that the company’s
value can be measured in the trillions.”); see also At a Glance, SAUDI ARAMCO, http://www.saudiaramco.com/
en/home.html#our-company%257C%252Fen%252Fhome%252Four-company%252Fat-a-glance.baseajax.
html (last visited Oct. 28, 2012). Saudi Aramco operates under the direction of the Ministry of Petroleum and
Mineral Resources. Our Leadership, SAUDI ARAMCO, http://www.saudiaramco.com/en/home.html#ourcompany%257C%252Fen%252Fhome%252Four-company%252Fleadership.baseajax.html (last visited Oct.
28, 2012).
203 The Basic Law of Government, Royal Decree No. A/90, 27 Sha’ban 1412 [Mar. 1, 1992] art. 14
(Saudi Arabia), available at http://www.saudiembassy.net/about/country-information/laws/The_Basic_Law_
Of_Governance.aspx.
204 See supra Part III.A.4.
205 See id.
206 See supra Part III.A.
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FDI flows bring economic benefits to the host state, and in order to increase
FDI flows, states must adopt neoliberal FDI regimes based on openness and
investor-friendly regulations.207 If FDI flows do not bring economic benefits,
however, then states would likely be less inclined to concede important
regulatory powers as a way to entice foreign investors.
Following a brief overview in Part IV.A of the academic debate
surrounding the relationship between FDI and economic growth, Part IV.B
presents statistical evidence regarding the degree to which the increased levels
of FDI have impacted short-term economic growth in the GCC.
A. The Academic Debate: The Impact of FDI on Economic Growth
Scholars have long debated the relationship between FDI and economic
growth, both in general208 and in relation to the Middle East.209 The research
has intensified during the past decade as a result of increased flows of global
capital.210 Three general theories have emerged in the literature, each seeking
to describe the impact that FDI has on economic growth.
The first theory on foreign investment is the so-called classical theory,
which states that “foreign investment is wholly beneficial to the host
economy.”211 Adherents to the classical theory argue that FDI elevates the
skills and knowledge of the indigenous work force,212 improves management
skills,213 contributes to capital accumulation,214 fosters economic
diversification and innovation, reinforces trade policies,215 improves and
207

See SORNARAJAH, supra note 73, at 48–52.
E.g., Brian J. Aitken & Ann E. Harrison, Do Domestic Firms Benefit from Direct Foreign Investment?
Evidence from Venezuela, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 605 (1999); Mona Haddad & Ann Harrison, Are There Positive
Spillovers from Direct Foreign Investment? Evidence from Panel Data for Morocco, 42 J. DEV. ECON. 51
(1993); Har Wai Mun et al., FDI and Economic Growth Relationship: An Empirical Study on Malaysia, INT’L
BUS. RES., Apr. 2008, at 11; Gheorghe Ruxanda & Andreea Muraru, FDI and Economic Growth. Evidence
From Simultaneous Equation Models, ROMANIAN J. ECON. FORECASTING, no. 1, 2010, at 45.
209 See Bassam M. AbuAl-Foul & Mohamed Soliman, Foreign Direct Investment and LDC Exports:
Evidence from the MENA Region, EMERGING MKTS. FIN. & TRADE, Mar.–Apr. 2008, at 4; Khazri Bilel &
Djelassi Mouldi, The Relationship Between Financial Liberalization, FDI and Economic Growth: An
Empirical Test for MENA Countries, ECON. & FIN. REV., DEC. 2011, at 20; Hussein, supra note 10;
Mohammed Omran & Ali Bolbol, Foreign Direct Investment, Financial Development, and Economic Growth:
Evidence from the Arab Countries, 1 REV. MIDDLE E. ECON. & FIN. 231 (2003).
210 Hussein, supra note 10, at 361.
211 SORNARAJAH, supra note 73, at 48.
212 Id.
213 See MICHAEL P. TODARO & STEPHEN C. SMITH, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 128 (8th ed. 2003).
214 Hussein, supra note 10, at 363.
215 SONORAJAH, supra note 73, at 48–52.
208
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increases access to technology,216 decreases unemployment,217 increases tax
revenues,218 breaks cycles of underdevelopment,219 and expands production,
marketing, transport, and communication networks.220 Proponents of the
classical theory also maintain that FDI fosters the infusion of foreign capital,
thereby freeing up domestic capital for projects directed toward public
benefit.221
The classical theory is rooted in free market economics and its concomitant
tenets. Following the triumph of capitalism upon the fall of the Berlin Wall and
facilitated by powerful states and prominent economic institutions such as the
World Bank and International Monetary Fund (also known as the “Washington
Consensus”), economic liberalism dominated global economic theory in the
1990s and greatly impacted states’ views towards FDI.222 The classical theory
continues to shape contemporary views towards FDI,223 although it does have
its critics.
The second theory of FDI as it relates to economic growth is the
“dependency theory,” which is “diametrically opposed to the classical theory,
and takes the view that foreign investment will not bring about meaningful
economic development.”224 The central tenets of this theory revolve around the
fact that most FDI is undertaken on the part of MNCs who, in effect, serve the
interests of the developed states in which they are headquartered.225 Some
scholars have stated that repatriation of profits attendant to FDI are greater
than the actual inflow of FDI.226 Regardless, these scholars argue that the
resources that do attend FDI by MNCs only benefit the local elite.227 Thus,
FDI, according to scholars who support the dependence theory, is actually

216

Eltony, supra note 94, at 92–93.
See TODARO & SMITH, supra note 213, at 128.
218 SORNARAJAH, supra note 73, at 51 (quoting Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a
Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 471, 496 (2009)).
219 See TODARO & SMITH, supra note 213, at 128–29.
220 SORNARAJAH, supra note 73, at 239, 260.
221 Id. at 48.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 51.
224 Id. at 53.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 49 (citing John R. Oneal & Frances H. Oneal, Hegemony, Imperialism, and the Profitability of
Foreign Investments, 42 INT’L ORG. 347 (1988)).
227 SORNARAJAH, supra note 73, at 50, 53.
217
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injurious to the host state insofar as it perpetuates developing states’
dependence on developed states.228
The final theory—the so-called “middle path” theory229—acknowledges, as
the name implies, both the positive and negative effects that FDI brings to the
host state.230 This theory was facilitated by the studies of the United Nations
Commission on Transnational Corporations (“UNCTC”), which demonstrated
that although “foreign investment through multinational corporations could
have harmful results in certain circumstances, . . . properly harnessed,
multinational corporations could be engines that fuel the growth of the
developing world.”231 In this sense, the objective of the host state is to attract
FDI while carefully regulating its effects.232 This appears to be the approach
taken by the GCC during the preceding two decades.233
In addition to examining various aspects of the relationship between FDI
and economic growth in other MENA countries,234 scholars have also analyzed
the impact of FDI on economic growth in the GCC.235 Yet scholars are divided
over whether and the extent to which FDI affects economic growth in the
GCC. Some scholars argue that FDI does in fact facilitate economic growth.236
Other scholars suggest that there is a “weak relationship between FDI and
GDP” in the GCC.237 Assessing the empirical link between FDI and GDP in
GCC states is complicated by volatility in the price of oil, upon which GCC
states heavily rely in their FDI and trade regimes, despite notable efforts to
reduce this volatility. Moreover, controlling for the effects of fixed capital
formation and international trade by GCC governments further complicates
serious analysis.
Regardless, no study has incorporated the data surrounding the recent
upsurge in FDI. The recent upsurge in FDI enables scholars to examine the
post-2000 modifications to GCC FDI regimes and their impact on increased
228

Id. at 53.
Id. at 55.
230 Id. at 56.
231 Id. at 55.
232 Id. at 56.
233 Hussein, supra note 10, at 363.
234 Bilel & Mouldi, supra note 209, at 20.
235 Mahmoud Al-Iriani & Fatima Al-Shamsi, Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth in GCC
Countries: A Causality Investigation Using Heterogeneous Panel Analysis, TOPICS MIDDLE E. & N. AFR.
ECONOMIES (Jan. 2007), http://www.luc.edu/orgs/meea/volume9/meea9.html.
236 E.g., id.; Faras & Ghali, supra note 28.
237 E.g., Hussein, supra note 10, at 362.
229
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levels of FDI. More importantly, the increase in FDI since 2002 enables
scholars to more effectively test for the impact of FDI on economic growth.
The higher the increase in FDI growth, the more likely it is for scholars to
determine a statistically significant link, if any, between FDI and economic
growth.238
B. Statistical Analysis: The Impact of FDI on Short-Term Economic Growth
The “ambiguous”239 results of scholarly inquiries into the relationship
between FDI and economic growth in the GCC is attributable, in part, to the
disparate data samples used by scholars in conducting their analyses and the
manner in which the same scholars correlate the data to the respective FDI
regimes being studied.240 Although some scholars have incorporated post-2000
data on FDI in the GCC into their analyses,241 many have not.242 Regardless,
unless distinctions are made between data that correlates to, on the one hand,
pre-2000 FDI regimes and, on the other, post-2000 FDI regimes, then nuanced
conclusions will remain aloof, especially considering that the coefficients of
the variables of interest in many studies (GDP, trade openness, fixed capital
formation, etc.) are highly correlated with the legal structure of the FDI
regime.243 In other words, studies that utilize post-2000 FDI data will be of
little consequence unless they also correlate such data to the post-2000 legal
regimes governing FDI, as all GCC regimes were modified to some degree or
another after 2000.244 Otherwise, the statistical link or lack thereof between
FDI and economic growth would be of little importance to both states and
scholars alike, as the relationship between the FDI regime itself and FDI levels
would be meaningless.
The differing conclusions in the literature regarding the relationship
between FDI and economic growth can also be attributed to the differing
methodologies utilized by the various scholars. Scholars have relied on such
empirical tests as the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method,245 heterogeneous
panel analysis,246 and various cointegration techniques247 to examine the
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246

Bilel & Mouldi, supra note 209, at 25.
Id. at 20.
Faras & Ghali, supra note 28, at 135.
E.g., id. at 136; Hussein, supra note 10, at 364.
E.g., Hussein, supra note 10, at 364.
Faras & Ghali, supra note 28, at 141–42.
Hussein, supra note 10, at 368.
Id. at 373.
Al-Iriani & Al-Shamsi, supra note 235, at 21.

TOONE GALLEYSPROOFS2

2012]

5/28/2013 1:09 PM

MIRAGE IN THE GULF

717

impact that FDI has on GDP, and vice versa. The different empirical methods
used by scholars have produced inconsistent results,248 resulting in a lack of
unanimous support for the proposition that FDI stimulates economic growth.
The various methodological approaches utilized by scholars are not without
merit, and differing conclusions can be expected given the sensitive correlation
between FDI and economic growth. Indeed, even scholars who conclude that
FDI impacts economic growth acknowledge that the correlation is subtle, with
large increases in FDI having only small impact on GDP growth.249 Yet, as
long as methodological differences prevent scholars from coming to uniform
conclusions about the impact of FDI on economic growth, this important
question will remain unanswered. For this reason, the dramatic upsurge in FDI
in the GCC since 2002 is both fortuitous and demanding of critical attention, as
it enables scholars to examine more definitively the impact that FDI growth
has on economic growth, in spite of methodological differences.
Rather than evaluating the correlation between FDI and economic growth
using a new methodological approach, this study seeks to apply accepted
statistical analysis methods. While methodology is important, the purpose here
is to provide the first general analysis of the new data, leaving more nuanced
analysis to statisticians and economists.250 In addition to basic statistical
analysis, this study will examine the impact of the upsurge in FDI on economic
growth in the GCC in light of the conclusions reached by Reyadh Faras and
Khalifa Ghali, authors of one of the most comprehensive analyses to date on
the subject of the relation between FDI and economic growth in the GCC.251
Faras and Ghali utilized a cointegration technique based on the autoregressive
distributed lag approach (“ARDL”), “which is proven to be more accurate than
other conventional co-integration techniques, especially when analyzing small
sample sizes such as is the case for GCC countries.”252

247

E.g., Faras & Ghali, supra note 28, at 135.
Id.
249 Id. at 142–43.
250 It is recognized that such an approach suffers from obvious flaws, including the fact that the “studies
did not fully control for simultaneity bias, country-specific effects, and the use of routine of lagged dependant
variable in growth regressions.” Jallab et al., supra note 10, at 4. Nor does it utilize dynamic panel procedures
that control for individual heterogeneity. Id. at 5.
251 See Faras & Ghali, supra note 28.
252 Id. at 136.
248
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Although suffering from many of the same limitations that characterize the
literature in general,253 Faras and Ghali made significant contributions to the
literature by analyzing state-specific relationships between FDI and economic
growth rather than examining the GCC as a whole, concluding that with the
exception of Kuwait, there existed “a weak but statistically significant causal
impact of FDI inflows on economic growth.”254
Part IV.B.1 examines the statistical impact that the increase in FDI had on
economic growth in the GCC since 2000 in light of the conclusions reached by
Faras and Ghali. Part IV.B.2 provides some brief observations regarding the
impact that the increase in FDI in the GCC had on long-term indicators of
human development.
1. The Statistical Link Between FDI and Short-Term Economic Growth
Considering the proximity between the date of this study and the time
period of the data under evaluation, this study will focus primarily on the
impact of the increased levels of FDI on short-term, as opposed to long-term,
growth. “It is common practice in the literature to use the growth rate of real
GDP as a measure of economic growth,”255 and short-term growth is measured
by the annual percentage change in real GDP.256
As indicated above, Faras and Ghali examined the relationship between
FDI and GDP in each GCC member state. With the exception of Kuwait,257
they found a short-run equilibrium relationship between the variables for each
GCC member state, evidenced by the following coefficients: 3.64 for the UAE,
1.08 for Oman, 1.05 for Saudi Arabia, .97 for Qatar, and .4 for Bahrain.258 A
coefficient of one implies that an increase in the growth rate of FDI in the short
run by ten percent causes the RGDP rate to increase by one percent.259
Averaging the coefficients of each GCC state together (with the exception of
Kuwait) results in a coefficient of 1.428, suggesting that ten percent growth in

253 The study only incorporated data up until 2006 and no distinction was made between data taken from
pre-modification of FDI regimes and post-modification. Faras & Ghali, supra note 28, at 136–37.
254 Id. at 143.
255 Id. at 137.
256 Id. at 142.
257 Faras and Ghali found no statistically significant relationship between the variables for Kuwait. Id. at
142–43.
258 Id. at 141–42.
259 Id. at 142.
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FDI in the GCC as a whole should result roughly in a 1.428% increase in the
GCC’s GDP in the short-term.
Figure 1: FDI Percentage Growth in the GCC, 2000 to 2010260
450.00%
400.00%
350.00%
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250.00%
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Figure 1 outlines the percentage of FDI growth in the GCC since 2000.261
The roughly 300% growth in FDI in 2000 should be accompanied by a 42.84%
growth in the GCC’s combined GDP in the short-run.262 Although the
definition of “short-run” in the literature is somewhat nebulous, it is often used
to refer to relatively immediate changes in the domestic economy as a result of
a rise in aggregate demand.263

260

UNCTAD, FDI Statistics, supra note 2.
See supra Figure 1.
262 See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
263 See, e.g., Economic Definition of Short-Run Aggregate Supply, ECON. GLOSSARY, http://glossary.
econguru.com/economic-term/short-run+aggregate+supply (last visited Oct. 2, 2012).
261
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Figure 2 juxtaposes the GCC’s actual percentage increases in the GCC’s
GDP onto the expected GDP growth rates postulated by Faras and Ghali.264
The expected GDP growth rate is depicted as the rise in GDP during the year
following the actual percentage rise in FDI (i.e., the 300% increase in FDI
inflows during 2000 would result in a roughly forty-two percent increase in the
GCC’s GDP during the following year).265
Figure 2: Actual Versus Expected (Faras) GDP Percentage Growth in the
GCC, 2000 to 2010266
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Naturally, the dashed line in Figure 2 mirrors the black line in Figure 1.267
However, while regression analysis would likely produce more nuanced
estimations, it is evident from Figure 2 that there is little correlation between
the GCC’s actual GDP percentage growth and the GDP percentage growth
expected from the Faras and Ghali analysis, suggesting the statistical
correlation between the increased levels of FDI and GDP growth from 2000 to
2010 is weak.

264
265
266
267

See infra Figure 2.
See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
See UNCTAD, FDI Statistics, supra note 2; see also Faras & Ghali, supra note 28.
Compare supra Figure 2, with supra Figure 1.
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Similar results can be seen when evaluating the actual versus expected
GDP growth rates in individual GCC member states. Figure 3 illustrates the
percentage of FDI growth in Saudi Arabia between 2000 and 2010.268
Figure 3: FDI Percentage Growth in Saudi Arabia, 2000 to 2010269
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According to Faras and Ghali, Saudi Arabia has an FDI–GDP coefficient of
1.05, suggesting that the FDI percentage increase in 2005, for example, of over
500 percent (indicated in Figure 3) would result in an increase in short-term
GDP growth of roughly fifty percent.270

268
269
270

See infra Figure 3.
See UNCTAD, FDI Statistics, supra note 2.
See Faras & Ghali, supra note 28, at 142.
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However, as Figure 4 indicates, at no point between 2000 and 2010 did
Saudi Arabia experience anything close to a fifty percent increase in GDP
growth.
Figure 4: Actual Versus Expected (Faras & Ghali) GDP Percentage Growth
in Saudi Arabia, 2000 to 2010271
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To be sure, Faras and Ghali do not argue that, in the case of Saudi Arabia, the
1.05% increase in GDP corresponding to the ten percent increase in FDI flows
would happen in the same year or the year following the increase in FDI.272 As
indicated above, the definition of “short-run” in the literature is somewhat
nebulous.273 However, Figure 4 reveals that besides there being only two years
where GDP growth surpassed even twenty percent, the statistical correlation
between the expected GDP growth (according to Faras and Ghali) and the
actual growth appears minimal.274

271
272
273
274

See UNCTAD, FDI Statistics, supra note 2.
See Faras & Ghali, supra note 28.
See supra note 263 and the accompanying text.
See supra Figure 4; see also Faras & Ghali, supra note 28.
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Similar results manifest themselves in the FDI and GDP trends since 2000
in the UAE, which, as indicated above, has a coefficient of 3.64, implying that
an increase in the growth rate of FDI in the short run by ten percent causes the
RGDP rate to increase by 3.64%.275
Figure 5: FDI Percentage Growth in the UAE, 2000 to 2010276
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Despite the dramatic percentage increase in FDI in 2002 and 2004, actual
GDP growth during the same time period was statistically insignificant in
relation to FDI growth, as indicated by Figure 6.277

275
276
277

See infra Figure 5.
See UNCTAD, FDI Statistics, supra note 2.
Compare supra Figure 5, with infra Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Actual Versus Expected (Faras & Ghali) GDP Percentage Growth
in the UAE, 2000 to 2010278
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Figure 6 reveals that the dramatic percentage increase in FDI in the UAE in
2003 (4380%) did not result in a concomitant increase in short-term GDP
percentage growth corresponding to the 3.64 coefficient.

278

See UNCTAD, FDI Statistics, supra note 2.
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Figure 7 presents the same information as Figure 6, absent the dramatic
expected GDP percentage growth figures of 2003, giving the reader a more
detailed look at how the UAE’s actual GDP percentage growth corresponded
to the GDP percentage growth predicted by Faras.
Figure 7: Actual Versus Expected (Faras & Ghali) GDP Percentage Growth
in the UAE, 2000 to 2010 (Absent 2003 Expected GDP Percentage Growth
Figure)279
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Even without the 2003 expected GDP percentage growth figure, data from
the UAE suggests that Faras and Ghali’s FDI–GDP short-term coefficients are
not entirely accurate and need to be adjusted to account for the new data
relating to the upsurge in FDI in the GCC since 2002. Indeed, the updated data
indicates that the statistical relation between increases in FDI and short-term
economic growth (as measured by GDP) is weak.
Overall, the foregoing analysis has relied on statistical analysis and cointegration techniques (ARDL) employed by Faras and Ghali,280 revealing the
lack of a clear correspondence between FDI growth and short-term economic
growth. While constituting only an introductory survey of the new data, the
279
280

Id.
See Faras & Ghali, supra note 28 at 137.
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foregoing analysis supports the work of other scholars who, utilizing different
methods and incomplete data, have cast doubt over the short-term economic
benefits that FDI brings to the host state.281
2. FDI, Long-Term Growth, and Other Economic Development Indicators
While the data attendant to the post-2002 increase in FDI does not lend
itself to nuanced assessments of the long-term implications of the new FDI
regimes in the Gulf and the increased FDI inflows those regimes have
generated, scholars can nonetheless integrate the new data into the existing
data from the past thirty years in order to draw preliminary conclusions.
Although, as indicated above, scholars should be wary of drawing conclusions
from the data when the pre-2000 data is associated with entirely different FDI
regimes,282 the following analysis briefly examines the integrity of Faras and
Ghali’s FDI–GDP long-term coefficients in light of the new data.

281
282

See, e.g., Jallab et al., supra note 10, at 13.
Id.; see Faras & Ghali, supra note 28.
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According to the Faras and Ghali analysis, the average long-run coefficient
for GCC member states is .365, suggesting that an increase in FDI by ten
percent leads to long-term GDP increases of 3.65%.283 Figure 8 outlines the
long-term FDI percentage increases in the GCC since 1980.
Figure 8: FDI Percentage Growth in the GCC, 1980 to 2010284
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See Faras & Ghali, supra note 28, at 141 tbl.6.
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Figure 9 suggests that the correlation between actual GDP percentage
growth in the GCC since 1980 and that expected from the Faras and Ghali
analysis remains weak.
Figure 9: Actual Versus Expected (Faras & Ghali) GDP Percentage Growth
in the GCC, 1980 to 2010285
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See UNCTAD, FDI Statistics, supra note 2.
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Figure 10 illustrates the long-term growth in GDP and FDI in absolute
dollar figures.
Figure 10: Long-term Growth of GCC FDI (in millions) and GDP (in
multiples of 10 million), 1980 to 2010.286
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Although a more accurate determination would be gained through regression
analysis of the variables, it appears from Figure 10 that there is a statistically
significant correlation between FDI and GDP long-term growth.287
This long-term correlation is supported by alternative indicators of
economic development, including the Human Development Index (“HDI”).288
“The HDI represents a push for a broader definition of well-being and provides
a composite measure of three basic dimensions of human development: health,
education and income.”289 The HDI incorporates the following indicators of
human and economic development: life expectancy at birth, expected and
mean years of schooling, Gross National Income per capita in purchasing
286

See UNCTAD, FDI Statistics, supra note 2.
See supra Figure 10.
288 See Human Development Index (HDI), U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi
(last visited Oct. 10, 2012).
289 See United Arab Emirates–Country Profile: Human Development Indicators, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME,
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/ARE.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2012).
287
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power parity terms, multidimensional poverty index, gender equality index,
and adjusted net savings.290 According to the U.N. Development Programme,
the UAE experienced a noticeable improvement in its HDI score around 2002,
suggesting a preliminary correlation between increases in FDI and economic
development.291 Saudi Arabia’s HDI growth rate, however, retained its
historical trajectory from 2000 to 2010, despite the increase in FDI inflows
during this same period.292
The available data suggests more of a statistical correlation between FDI
levels and long-term economic growth than between FDI and short-term
economic growth. However, more research needs to be done to more
effectively incorporate the post-2002 FDI data from the GCC into the
statistical analyses surrounding the impact of FDI on economic growth.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis of the upsurge in FDI in the GCC and the legal
regimes giving rise to this upsurge is a modest attempt to evaluate the impact
of increased FDI levels on economic growth in the GCC. The data suggests
that among the primary factors contributing to the upsurge in FDI in the GCC
was the liberal FDI policies adopted by GCC member states. Although the rise
in the price of crude oil and the global expansion in FDI flows prior to 2008
also likely contributed to the rise in FDI,293 the inflows in FDI into the GCC—
even during the global recession—were facilitated by open FDI regimes
instituted by GCC member states, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE. More
importantly, the foregoing analysis reveals that GCC member states
successfully promoted open FDI regimes while simultaneously maintaining
regulatory control over strategic economic sectors, particularly in the areas of
labor regulation and resource management. In this sense, GCC member states’
recent FDI success is remarkable not merely because of the degree to which
FDI increased, but because GCC states fostered increased FDI levels while
maintaining a notable amount of sovereign control over important aspects of
the FDI regime.

290

Id.
Id.
292 Compare id., with Human Development Report 2011: Saudi Arabia, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME,
http://hdrstats.undp.org/images/explanations/SAU.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2011).
293 See supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text.
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The decrease in FDI since 2010 reinforces the tenuous relationship between
neoliberal FDI regimes and increased FDI levels. Moreover, the foregoing
analysis suggests that even dramatically high increases in FDI do not
necessarily have a statistically significant correlation to short-term economic
growth. The available data suggests a more definitive statistical correlation
between FDI and long-term economic growth, although more statistical
research needs to be done to more effectively incorporate the data from the
post-2002 upsurge and post-2010 decline in FDI into the academic debate.
This Article has sought to incorporate data from 2002 to 2010 into the
literature and to make some preliminary observations regarding the statistical
relation between FDI and economic growth in light of the new data.
For states—particularly resource-rich, Middle Eastern states such as
Libya—seeking to foster long-term development and more effectively
integrate into the global economy, the results of the foregoing analysis should
be instructive. After all, the GCC is considered the “anchor of stability” in the
MENA region, and its reforms are often a harbinger for regional economic
development.294 No longer do the tenets of classical economic thought find
uniform support in the literature.295 If anything, the upsurge in FDI since 2002
in the GCC underscores the fact that resource-rich states can develop
successful FDI regimes without abdicating regulatory control over aspects
central to national interests.
It is not inaccurate to label some of the central tenets of the classical theory
of economic growth as seductive mirages, at least as they apply in a GCC
context. That is, no longer can it be assumed that successful FDI regimes
depend upon open, unregulated, and investor-friendly laws. The GCC
experience since 2000 demonstrates that while liberal policies are no doubt
essential to the promotion of FDI, they can be supplemented with strategic
regulatory controls that protect local investors and ensure long-term economic
stability. The data available from the post-2002 upsurge in FDI also suggests
that it would be ill-advised for resource-rich, Middle Eastern states to assume
that high levels of FDI will translate ipso facto into increased economic
growth, at least in the short term.
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Hertog, supra note 163, at 67.
See supra Part I.

